

**IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA**

In the Matter of	:	No. 2608 Disciplinary Docket No. 3
	:	
JIMMIE MOORE	:	No. 87 DB 2019
	:	
PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT	:	Attorney Registration No. 24513
	:	
	:	(Philadelphia)

**ORDER**

**PER CURIAM**

**AND NOW**, this 18<sup>th</sup> day of August, 2025, the Petition for Reinstatement is granted. Petitioner is ordered to pay the expenses incurred by the Board in the investigation and processing of the Petition for Reinstatement. See Pa.R.D.E. 218(f).

Justice Brobson notes his dissent.

Justices Dougherty and Wecht did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.

A True Copy Nicole Traini  
As Of 08/18/2025

Attest:   
Chief Clerk  
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

BEFORE THE DISCIPLINARY BOARD OF THE  
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

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JIMMIE MOORE	:	
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PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT	:	(Philadelphia)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF  
THE DISCIPLINARY BOARD OF THE  
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND JUSTICES  
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA:

Pursuant to Rule 218(c)(5) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement, The Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania submits its findings and recommendations to your Honorable Court with respect to the above captioned Petition for Reinstatement.

I. FACTUAL FINDINGS

The Board makes the following findings of fact:

The Misconduct

1. Petitioner, Jimmie Moore, was born on February 19, 1951, and was admitted to the practice of law in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in 1976.

Petitioner is subject to the jurisdiction of the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

2. Following his admission to the Pennsylvania Bar in 1976, Petitioner primarily practiced civil and criminal law in the City of Philadelphia, including for Housing and Urban Development, the Pennsylvania Council for Community Advancement ("PCCA"), and as a solo practitioner. N.T. 3/6/24 at pp. 273-274.

3. In 1999, Petitioner was elected a Judge of the Philadelphia Municipal Court. N.T. 3/6/24 at p. 274.

4. Petitioner served as a Municipal Court Judge for approximately eleven years. He resigned in July 2011 to run for a seat in Congress in 2012 in the First Congressional District in Pennsylvania. N.T. 3/6/24 at pp. 283, 285.

5. Petitioner did not stay in the Congressional election campaign because he "ran out of money." N.T. 3/6/24 at p. 288. During the campaign, Petitioner received a contribution from another candidate for the position in the amount of \$90,000.00. Thereafter, Petitioner withdrew from the race. N.T. 3/6/24 at p. 290. A scheme was created to hide both the source and reason for the transaction whereby three separate payments were made to Petitioner. N.T. 3/6/24 at pp. 290-293.

6. Some of the money Petitioner received when he dropped out of the race for Congress went to reimburse vendors and some went to him personally and his girlfriend at the time. N.T. 3/7/24 at p. 65.

7. Although Petitioner knew it was illegal, in October 2012 and June 2013, he filed false statements with the Federal Election Commission concealing the payments. N.T. 3/6/24 at p. 293.
8. After he withdrew from the election, Petitioner resumed a very limited private practice until 2017. N.T. 3/6/24 at pp. 297-298.
9. In 2017, Petitioner applied for and became a senior judge in the Philadelphia Municipal Court. N.T. 3/6/24 at pp. 308-309.
10. In April 2017, the FBI came to Petitioner while he was a senior judge and advised him that he was the subject of a criminal investigation. Petitioner assisted and cooperated with the FBI in their criminal investigation of others and wore a wire. N.T. 3/6/24 at p. 310. He also testified against an accomplice. N.T. 3/6/24 at pp. 310-311.
11. Petitioner continued to sit as a senior judge and presided over criminal cases during the FBI investigation. N.T. 3/7/24 at pp. 80-83; 3/6/24 at pp. 180-181, 312.
12. Petitioner knew he should not have sat or continued to sit as a senior judge when he had violated federal election campaign laws several years earlier and when he was investigated by the FBI in 2017. *Id.*
13. Petitioner did not report that he was a subject of a criminal investigation to the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts because he did not know he had to report it. N.T. 3/6/24 at p. 312.



14. In September 2017, Petitioner was charged with making false reports in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. §1101(a)(1) and (2).
15. Petitioner resigned as a senior judge after he signed his guilty plea agreement. N.T. 3/6/24 at pp. 307-309. The Attorney Registration Office placed Petitioner on retired license status on October 17, 2017. ODC Exhibit 1.
16. Petitioner entered a plea of guilty on October 3, 2017, before the Honorable Jan E. DuBois in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. N.T. 3/6/24 at pp. 313, 314.
17. Petitioner reported his plea to Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) on September 29, 2018. ODC and Petitioner jointly petitioned the Supreme Court for temporary suspension of Petitioner’s license to practice law and by Order dated May 13, 2019, the Court temporarily suspended Petitioner. N.T. 3/6/24 at pp. 314-315.
18. Petitioner was sentenced on December 12, 2019, to two years of probation and fined \$100.00. Petitioner complied with all conditions of his probation. N.T. 3/6/24 at pp. 313-314.
19. ODC filed a Petition for Discipline against Petitioner on May 7, 2020, based on his criminal conviction.
20. Following a disciplinary hearing, by Report filed on March 12, 2021, the Hearing Committee recommended a suspension for four years, retroactive to May 13, 2019, the date of the temporary suspension. N.T. 3/6/24 at p. 315; Pet. Exhibit J-2(B)(v).

21. By Report filed on June 12, 2021, the Board recommended to the Court that Petitioner be disbarred. Pet. Exhibit J-2(B)(ii).

22. Petitioner took exception to the Board's disbarment recommendation.

23. Following oral argument, the Court rejected the Board's recommendation and by Order dated March 16, 2022, suspended Petitioner for four years retroactive to the May 13, 2019 temporary suspension. N.T. 3/6/24 at p. 316.

#### The Petition for Reinstatement

24. Petitioner filed a Petition for Reinstatement and Reinstatement Questionnaire on April 27, 2023, and a supplement to the Petition on May 19, 2023.

25. ODC investigated the Petition for Reinstatement. Petitioner provided substantial documentation consisting of hundreds of pages requested by ODC between May 2023 and September 2023. N.T. 3/7/24 at pp. 8,9,10, 162-163. Petitioner drove to Harrisburg and Wilmington, Delaware to obtain personal records to satisfy ODC's requests. N.T. 3/7/24 at pp. 99-100, 173, 182.

26. After receiving ODC's September 19, 2023 letter requesting additional information, Petitioner responded on September 21, 2023 through his counsel and advised ODC that he had "cooperated enough" and would not be providing any additional information, and requested a hearing. ODC Exhibits 19, 20. Petitioner testified that he felt frustrated and had responded as best he could to ODC, was not able to obtain some information, and believed he had cooperated by providing many documents. N.T. 3/7/24 at pp. 11, 12, 13, 169-171.

27. ODC filed a letter response to the Petition for Reinstatement on October 23, 2023. ODC raised areas of concern bearing on Petitioner's moral qualifications and competency to resume the practice of law. These concerns included, *inter alia*, errors and omissions on the Reinstatement Questionnaire, bankruptcies, lawsuits, open liens and judgments, real property issues with unresolved licenses and inspections violations and unpaid bills, and handling of legal referrals and receipt of referral fees.

28. Following a prehearing conference on January 30, 2024, a District I Hearing Committee held a reinstatement hearing on March 6 and 7, 2024.

29. Petitioner testified on his own behalf and presented nine character witnesses. He introduced exhibits J-1 through J-3(c) and P-1 through P-3. These exhibits were accepted into evidence without objection.

30. ODC introduced exhibits ODC-1 through ODC-64(d). These exhibits were accepted into evidence without objection. ODC cross-examined Petitioner and Petitioner's witnesses but did not present any witnesses.

31. Petitioner testified at length and addressed the areas of concern raised by ODC and his efforts to correct errors or omissions.

32. Petitioner has never been disciplined while serving as a judge and has no record of attorney discipline since his admission in 1976 but for the current suspension. N.T. 3/6/24 at pp. 284-285.

33. Petitioner filed for bankruptcy three times in the 1990s, all of which have been resolved. N.T. 3/6/24 at p. 282; N.T. 3/7/24 at pp. 107-108; ODC Exhibits 45-48.

34. Petitioner acknowledged that some of his real estate investments in the 1990s through 2012 prior to his suspension were unsuccessful. N.T. 3/7/24 at pp. 32, 36, 106; ODC Exhibits 33-38, 64.

35. Petitioner owned two residential properties in Philadelphia that he rented. N.T. 3/6/24 at p. 299.

36. Petitioner did not have a rental license for one of his properties. N.T. 3/6/24 at pp. 300-302. He did not think he needed one because his family members resided there. *Id.* The issue is on appeal before the Board of Revision of Taxes in Philadelphia. Petitioner testified he will get a rental license depending on how the appeal is decided and pay any monies owed. *Id.*

37. Petitioner acknowledged there were several tax judgments relating to Locust Abstract, a company formed by Petitioner in the 1980s or 1990s which had not been used for decades. Petitioner paid all of the judgments. N.T. 3/7/24 at pp. 14-22.

38. There were several liens and lawsuits relating to non-payment of taxes against Petitioner, or against businesses with which he was involved. N.T. 3/7/24 at pp. 46-59; ODC Exhibits 18, 27, 57-59. Petitioner confirmed these liens have all been paid with the exception of a gas lien. N.T. 3/7/24 at p. 59.

39. Some of the liens/judgments were satisfied or removed in 2023 after Petitioner learned about them when ODC brought them to his attention. N.T. 3/7/24 at p. 99.
40. All of Petitioner's tax returns have been filed and all taxes are current. N.T. 3/7/24 at pp. 15, 16, 17, 60, 61.
41. Petitioner admitted that there had been code violations with his rental properties. N.T. 3/7/24 at pp. 113-119. These code violations have been resolved. N.T. 3/7/24 at p. 176. Petitioner acknowledged that he had a duty to obey the Philadelphia Licenses and Inspections codes. N.T. 3/7/24 at p. 122.
42. Petitioner failed to list 38 lawsuits on his Reinstatement Questionnaire relating to liens, taxes, and real estate disputes. N.T. 3/7/24 at pp. 155-160. The overwhelming majority were from 1990 through 1999 with one occurring during 2012. He did not do any research to find them before ODC brought them to his attention. N.T. 3/7/24 at pp. 173-174.
43. All of these lawsuits or claims were resolved by the time of the reinstatement hearing in March 2024. N.T. 3/7/24 at p. 171.
44. Petitioner has resolved every debt, tax lien and lawsuit to the best of his ability. N.T. 3/7/24 at p. 171-172.
45. In 2017, Petitioner referred two cases to James McEldrew, III, Esquire and later accepted two referral fees totaling \$8,666.66. Petitioner disclosed the referral fees on his Reinstatement Questionnaire in response to Question 6(b).

46. Petitioner believed he was on active status as an attorney when he referred the cases to Attorney McEldrew in 2017 and believed he was able to accept the fees. N.T. 3/6/24 at p. 322. However, Petitioner actually was on retired status at the time he referred the cases to Mr. McEldrew and as a formerly admitted attorney who did not have an active attorney license, was not entitled to a referral fee. N.T. 3/6/25 at pp. 321, 322, 323.

47. ODC's counsel questioned Petitioner's completion of a Pennsylvania Annual Attorney's Fee Form on March 18, 2018, where he had stated that he was "retired." ODC Exhibit 1-(a).

48. Petitioner expressed confusion regarding his license status and testified that he did not realize he was on retired status at the time of the referral of the cases until the first day of the reinstatement hearing. N.T. 3/6/24 at pp. 321-322.

49. Petitioner agreed that it was wrong to collect the fees as he had been on retired status. N.R. 3/6/24 at pp. 322, 323.

50. Petitioner was diagnosed with prostate cancer in 2003 and experienced a recurrence in 2014. N.T. 3/6/24 at p. 336. The cancer is presently in remission. *Id.* Petitioner takes medication for various other medical conditions. N.T. 3/6/24 at pp. 336-338.

51. None of these medical conditions would prevent Petitioner from practicing law. N.T. 3/6/24 at pp. 339-340.

52. During his suspension, Petitioner completed required Continuing Legal Education courses. N.T. 3/6/24 at p. 323; Pet. Exhibit J-2[E]. Petitioner completed

36 required hours and an additional 17 hours for a total of 53 hours of CLEs. He also reads *The Legal Intelligencer* on a regular basis. N.T. 3/6/24 at pp. 326, 327.

53. During his suspension, Petitioner engaged in community service activities. N.T. 3/6/24 at pp. 327-333.

- a. On behalf of the organization Brothahood, Petitioner goes twice a month to a prison with his pastor, Reverend Damone Jones, to meet with juveniles who are charged as adults. There is mentoring through basketball games and discussions with the juveniles.
- b. Petitioner volunteers for the Youth Elevation Project ("YEP"), a program that teaches youth about aviation and encourages careers in that sector. Petitioner's role is to counsel the youth in terms of preparing resumes, interviewing, and being job ready.
- c. Petitioner volunteers for a tall ships program at Penn's Landing and helps prepare the ships for tours.
- d. Petitioner talks to young people involved with an apprentice program at a local laborers' union.
- e. Petitioner intends to continue his volunteer work with these programs in the future.

54. During his suspension, Petitioner wrote a detective novel under a pen name and plans to write a second book. N.T. 3/6/24 at pp 317, 318, 319.

55. While suspended, Petitioner has not practiced law or held himself out as eligible to practice law or give legal advice. N.T. 3/6/24 at pp. 319, 320.

56. Petitioner accepted full responsibility for violating ethical rules and engaging in misconduct. N.T. 3/6/24 at pp. 316-317, 323; N.T. 3/7/24 at pp. 177-179.

57. Petitioner expressed genuine remorse for his misconduct. In response to Question 15 of the Reinstatement Questionnaire, which asked for any other facts or matters he desired to have considered, Petitioner stated, "A day does not go by without me regretting my wrongdoing and feeling remorseful for what I did. Every day I have to look myself in the mirror and reckon with the shame, embarrassment, and hurt I caused to my family, friends, mentees, fellow jurists, community, Courts, and Bar. I take full responsibility for my actions. I know that my wrongdoing tainted and caused stains to the integrity and standing of the Courts and Bar."

58. Petitioner testified:

I have been a lawyer for, what, some 35, 40 years, a judge, a public figure. Tried, you know, during the period of time not to get in trouble, not to do anything. Folks look up to lawyers, look up to judges. And, you know, for a long time, I just stayed in the house other than to get food and what have you, because I was so embarrassed. And I'm sorry in terms of whatever disgrace I may have brought to the bar, to the members of the bench, to my family, to those folks that believed in me, you know, prior to me getting out of the race and giving me their hard earned dollars.  
N.T. 3/6/24 at p 323.

59. Petitioner further testified:

I apologize for any embarrassment, disgrace I may have brought to my colleagues on the bench, in terms of my colleagues in the practice of law, you know, the general community that had confidence in me.  
N.T. 3/7/24 at pp. 60-61.



60. Petitioner believes he has something left to give to the profession and wants to make amends. *Id.*

61. If he is reinstated, Petitioner intends to have a limited practice that allows him to choose his projects, with some pro bono work to help people. N.T. 3/7/24 at p. 172.

62. Petitioner's testimony is credible.

63. Petitioner presented the testimony of nine character witnesses.

a. Jeffrey Miller, Esquire credibly testified that he has been a practicing lawyer since 1970 and represented Petitioner in his criminal case. He explained the criminal proceedings involving Petitioner. He testified that he knows Petitioner very well and that Petitioner has accepted responsibility for his conduct and has expressed remorse. He believed that Petitioner's reputation in the community for truthfulness and honesty was "very good." He testified that Petitioner's reputation as a peaceful and law-abiding citizen is "excellent." Attorney Miller had no hesitation in recommending Petitioner's reinstatement to the practice of law. N.T. 3/6/24 at pp. 50-77.

b. Wadud Ahmed, Esquire credibly testified that he has known Petitioner professionally for twenty-one years and described Petitioner as a mentor to him in his practice as an attorney in Philadelphia. He confirmed that Petitioner had accepted

responsibility for and had remorse for his misconduct. He testified that Petitioner is held in high regard in the community and had a good reputation for truth and honesty. Attorney Ahmed had no hesitation in recommending Petitioner's reinstatement to the practice of law. N.T. 3/6/24 at pp. 79-110.

- c. Reverend Damone B. Jones, Sr. credibly testified that he is a senior pastor at the Bible Way Baptist Church in West Philadelphia. He testified that Petitioner has been a member of the church for many years. He testified that Petitioner has accepted responsibility for his misconduct. He also testified regarding Petitioner's regular participation in a program that he runs in a prison for juveniles who have been arrested in Philadelphia and charged as adults. He confirmed that Petitioner has a good reputation in the community as a truthful and honest person and as a peaceful and law-abiding person. Reverend Jones had no hesitation in recommending Petitioner's reinstatement to the practice of law. N.T. 3/6/24 at pp. 111-129.
- d. Sarah Lewis is a retired nurse's aide. She credibly testified that she is Petitioner's friend and assisted him when he ran for judge. She has known him since 1986. She testified as to Petitioner's active involvement in the community, especially with youth. She testified that she believes Petitioner accepted responsibility for his

misconduct. Ms. Lewis testified as to Petitioner's excellent reputation in the community as a peaceful and law-abiding person and as a truthful and honest person. N.T. 3/6/24 at pp. 133-154.

- e. Rose Harper represents community groups in Southwest Philadelphia. She has known Petitioner for forty years. She credibly testified Petitioner had worked at the PCCA with her, and he was still involved in the community. She testified that Petitioner has a good reputation in the community as a truthful and honest person and as a peaceful and law-abiding citizen. Ms. Harper testified that Petitioner accepted responsibility for his misconduct and she had no hesitation in recommending his reinstatement to the practice of law. N.T. 3/6/24 at pp. 156-171.
- f. Marcus Brandt testified that he has known Petitioner for two or three years when Petitioner came to Penn's Landing to volunteer to work on tall ships on the Delaware River. He testified that Petitioner continues to volunteer in various tasks on the ships on behalf of a non-profit entity approximately once a month, and he expects that this will continue for the indefinite future. He did not make any comment on Petitioner's fitness or capability of practicing law. N.T. 3/6/24 at pp. 180-198.
- g. James McEldrew, III, Esquire credibly testified that he has practiced law for forty-two years and is a good friend of Petitioner. He has

known him since they were opposing attorneys in the 1980s. He credibly testified that Petitioner accepted full responsibility for his misconduct and that Petitioner had a reputation in the community as a truthful and honest person and as a peaceful and law-abiding person. He had “no hesitation whatsoever” in recommending Petitioner’s reinstatement. Attorney McEldrew testified that Petitioner referred two matters to him and he had paid referral fees to Petitioner in 2019. Although Mr. McEldrew did not remember the details of the referrals, he recalled that he checked if Petitioner was a lawyer when the case was referred. He did not know that Petitioner had been identified as “retired” at the time of the referrals. N.T. 3/6/24 at pp. 199-237.

- h. Khadijah Aziz credibly testified that she was Petitioner’s judicial secretary when he was a judge until he left the bench in 2012. She confirmed that Petitioner has a good reputation in the community as a truthful and honest person and as a peaceful and law-abiding person. She testified that Petitioner used to teach paralegal courses and mentioned his involvement with charitable causes, including YEP. She testified that Petitioner accepted responsibility for his misconduct and expressed remorse. Ms. Aziz had no hesitation in recommending Petitioner’s reinstatement to the practice of law. N.T. 3/6/24 at pp. 237-256.

- i. Kawana Shaw credibly testified that Petitioner has been a mentor to her since 2009. She runs the non-profit organization known as YEP, which helps instill confidence in young people by teaching them aviation skills and advising them on careers in aviation. Petitioner is an active member of this organization helping young people. She confirmed Petitioner's good reputation in the community as a peaceful and law-abiding person and as a truthful and honest person. Ms. Shaw had no hesitation in recommending that Petitioner be reinstated to the practice of law. N.T. 3/6/24 at pp. 257-268.

#### The Proceedings Below

64. On April 30, 2024, Petitioner filed a post-hearing brief in support of his reinstatement.

65. On May 10, 2024, ODC filed a post-hearing brief and recommended to the Committee that Petitioner's Petition for Reinstatement be denied.

66. The Committee filed a Report on July 9, 2024, and concluded that Petitioner met his reinstatement burden. The Committee recommended to the Board that the Petition for Reinstatement be granted.

67. By letter dated July 24, 2024, ODC advised the Board Prothonotary that it was not submitting exceptions to the Committee's Report and recommendation.

68. The Board adjudicated this matter at the meeting on October 25, 2024.

II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. Petitioner established by clear and convincing evidence that he possesses the moral qualifications, competency and learning in the law required for admission to the practice of law in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Pa.R.D.E. 218(c)(3).

2. Petitioner established by clear and convincing evidence that his resumption of the practice of law within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania will be neither detrimental to the integrity and standing of the bar or the administration of justice nor subversive of the public interest. Pa.R.D.E. 218(c)(3).

III. DISCUSSION

Petitioner seeks readmission to the practice of law following his suspension for a period of four years ordered by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania on March 16, 2022, retroactive to May 13, 2019. Pursuant to Pa.R.D.E. 218(a)(4), an attorney who is suspended for a period exceeding one year may not resume the practice of law until reinstated by the Court.

Petitioner bears the burden of proving by evidence that is clear and convincing, that he is morally qualified, competent and learned in the law and that his resumption of the practice of law will not be detrimental to the integrity and standing of the bar or the administration of justice nor subversive of the public interest. Pa.R.D.E. 218(c)(3). This burden is not light, and reinstatement is not automatic. A reinstatement proceeding is a searching inquiry into a lawyer's present professional and moral fitness

to resume the practice of law. The object of concern is not solely the transgressions that gave rise to the lawyer's suspension, but rather, the nature and extent of the rehabilitative efforts made since the time the sanction was imposed and the degree of success achieved in the rehabilitative process. *Philadelphia News, Inc. v. Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania*, 363 A.2d 779, 780-781 (Pa. 1976). This inquiry necessarily involves thorough examination of a wide range of issues relevant to a petitioner's fitness to resume the practice of law. *Id.*

The Committee weighed the evidence, concluded that Petitioner met his stringent burden of proof, and recommended that Petitioner be reinstated. ODC initially opposed reinstatement following the hearing, but ultimately did not object to the Committee's Report and recommendation to grant reinstatement. Upon our independent review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner met his reinstatement burden and respectfully recommend to the Court that the Petition for Reinstatement be granted.

Petitioner credibly testified on his own behalf and presented testimony from eight credible character witnesses.<sup>1</sup> The totality of this testimony and evidence demonstrates that Petitioner is fit to practice and his resumption of practice will be neither detrimental to the integrity and standing of the bar or the administration of justice, nor subversive of the public interest.

Petitioner was born in 1951 and was 73 years of age as of the date of the reinstatement hearing. He has been suspended from the practice of law since May 13,

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<sup>1</sup> The Committee found the testimony of Marcus Brandt to be not credible. See Committee Report, p. 14, ¶ 1. The Board defers to the Committee's finding.

2019. Petitioner's four year term of suspension was predicated upon his guilty plea to one count of false statements under 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1) and (2). Petitioner concealed from the Federal Election Commission three payments, totaling \$90,000, from a campaign contribution to Petitioner's campaign in violation of 52 U.S.C. § 30104. For his criminal acts, Petitioner was sentenced to two years of probation and a \$100.00 fine. Petitioner reported his conviction to ODC and jointly entered into a petition to temporarily suspend his law license.

Petitioner established by clear and convincing evidence that he served his suspension without further criminal incident and engaged in sufficient rehabilitation to remedy the harm caused by his wrongful actions. Petitioner was candid and forthcoming during his direct testimony and in response to ODC's cross-examination. Petitioner did not minimize or justify his criminal conduct and appreciated the magnitude of his acts. Petitioner accepted full responsibility for his serious misconduct and credibly communicated his genuine remorse for the disgrace he brought to the bar, the members of the bench, his family and community members, and his understanding that the reputations of the profession and the courts were negatively affected.

During his period of suspension, Petitioner actively served his community by volunteering with several organizations. The Brotherhood provides mentoring to juveniles incarcerated on adult charges. Petitioner visits the prison twice per month with his pastor to provide mentorship through basketball games and discussions. Petitioner also donates his time to YEP, a project that helps empower youth by teaching them about careers in aviation. For that organization, Petitioner provides counseling for resume



preparation and interview skills. Petitioner volunteers for a tall ships organization at Penn's Landing. And, Petitioner indicated he provides support to a laborers' union apprenticeship program by speaking with young people. The record demonstrates that Petitioner has been a positive presence in his community and has a history of volunteer service to others. Petitioner's service projects during his suspension are a continuation of his desire to help others. Petitioner credibly testified that he intends to continue his involvement in these projects in the future.

As relates to his learning in the law, Petitioner satisfied the 36 hours of Continuing Legal Education required for reinstatement and completed 17 additional hours during his suspension. To keep apprised of current law, Petitioner read *The Legal Intelligencer*. During the suspension period, Petitioner avoided practicing law, holding himself out as eligible to do so, or giving legal advice. Petitioner conveyed his plans to reenter the profession if reinstated. Noting that at 73 years of age, he is not interested in a full-time practice of law, Petitioner shared his desire to regain his license to practice on a limited basis with the opportunity to perform pro bono work.<sup>2</sup> Petitioner believes he still has something to offer his community through legal services and expressed a sincere desire to give back to his community, which he has served for decades.

In addition to his own credible testimony as to his qualifications for reinstatement, Petitioner's numerous character witnesses provided credible, consistent

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<sup>2</sup> The dissent refers to the statement of Mr. Stretton, Petitioner's counsel, that "right now [Petitioner] wants to just fool around with it a little." N.T. 3/7/24 at p. 207. Based on Petitioner's credible testimony that he is interested in a part-time practice of law, we find Mr. Stretton did not mean "fool around" in a literal sense, but rather that Petitioner does not desire a full-time practice.

and un rebutted testimony that established Petitioner's moral qualifications and fitness to resume the practice of law. These witnesses have known Petitioner personally and professionally for many years. While some witnesses were better acquainted with the details of Petitioner's criminal conduct than others, all of the witnesses were aware of his criminal conviction and attested to his acceptance of responsibility for his misconduct and his true remorse. This credible testimony depicts Petitioner as an individual whose contributions to his community are valued and who is held in high esteem by that community, despite his past wrongdoing. This evidence supports the conclusion that the conduct that caused Petitioner's suspension is not characteristic of the person he is and that his reinstatement will not present a danger to the public or harm the integrity or standing of the courts or the bar.

After investigating Petitioner's Petition for Reinstatement ODC raised concerns related to Petitioner's fitness for reinstatement.<sup>3</sup> The concerns generally encompassed errors and omissions on the Reinstatement Questionnaire, receipt of referral fees, tax matters, and issues arising from Petitioner's financially unsuccessful business ventures. Petitioner testified at length about these issues. We find that these issues do not pose an impediment to reinstatement.

As an initial matter, we address ODC's position that Petitioner was uncooperative with its investigation. Subsequent to the filing of the Petition for Reinstatement on April 27, 2023 and supplement on May 19, 2023, ODC made multiple

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<sup>3</sup> After the Committee filed its recommendation to grant reinstatement, ODC elected not to submit exceptions.

requests for information from Petitioner. The record demonstrates significant communication between Petitioner and ODC. In response to ODC's requests, Petitioner supplied hundreds of pages of additional material, even driving to Harrisburg and Delaware to collect requested information. In September 2023, ODC again asked for additional material, to which Petitioner issued a written response that he had "cooperated enough" and wanted a hearing. Petitioner testified about his response and explained that he had supplied a great deal of information and felt frustrated by ODC's September 2023 inquiry and thought that he was entitled to a hearing. While Petitioner could have addressed ODC's request more politely, we find that the totality of the record demonstrates Petitioner's cooperation with ODC. Petitioner provided substantially everything that was asked for that was within his possession, custody and control. Petitioner fully answered ODC's questions at the hearing as to the materials he provided. There is no evidence that Petitioner was recalcitrant and obstructive to ODC's investigation.

Regarding the errors and omissions on the Reinstatement Questionnaire, ODC's investigation revealed missing and incomplete information, such as Petitioner's failure to list lawsuits where he was a named party, tax liens, and debts 90 days past due.<sup>4</sup> ODC made numerous requests for additional information to obtain complete answers. In response, Petitioner provided substantial documentation and materials and

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<sup>4</sup> The dissent indicates that Petitioner "falsely certified" on his Questionnaire that he had no outstanding taxes, unsatisfied judgments, or debts 90 days past due. We find no support in the record to demonstrate that Petitioner had the intent to provide incorrect information. Rather, the record supports the finding that Petitioner answered the Questionnaire with the information he had at hand, acknowledged that he did not perform research or docket searches, and later supplemented the record when ODC advised him of missing and incomplete information.

fully answered all questions related to the Questionnaire during his testimony. He credibly explained his omission of information and inaccurate responses and testified that he did not perform research or docket searches when completing his petition. ODC probed Petitioner's answers on the Questionnaire and he supplied credible and satisfactory responses.

The Questionnaire, supplement to the Petition, additional documentation, and Petitioner's testimony allowed for a rigorous review of the matters at issue. While certainly it would have been prudent for Petitioner to have been more thorough and supplied complete information when he first filed his Questionnaire, the totality of the evidence demonstrates that Petitioner satisfactorily answered the sweeping questions put to him in the Questionnaire. There is no evidence that Petitioner's responses on his Questionnaire were dishonest or deceitful or that his testimony related to the errors and omissions and his corrections of such was not credible. There is no evidence that Petitioner was trying to conceal information from ODC. For these reasons, we conclude that the errors and omissions, subsequently corrected, do not cast doubt on Petitioner's competence or moral qualifications to an extent that would prevent Petitioner's reinstatement.

The case precedent supports the Board's conclusion. A defective questionnaire should not be a bar to reinstatement where the petitioner credibly testifies at the hearing and explains the discrepancies. See *In the Matter of Jonathan M. Levin*, No. 108 DB 2001 (D. Bd. Rpt. 1/3/2011) (S. Ct. Order 4/15/2011) ("Errors and omissions on a reinstatement questionnaire are not automatic bars to reinstatement where a

petitioner testifies at a hearing and fully explains the discrepancies.” (citing *In re Anonymous*, No. 1 DB 73, Pa. D. & C. 3d 406 (1984); *In the Matter of Robert F. Creem*, No. 181 DB No. 2003 (D. Bd. Rpt. 8/27/2008) (S. Ct. Order 11/21/2008)). Here, it is undisputed that Petitioner’s Questionnaire presented defects in several areas. However, any concerns regarding these defects were dispelled by Petitioner’s subsequent provision of additional material and credible explanations through his testimony.

Turning to the bankruptcy filings, taxes, liens and judgments, many related to Petitioner’s business dealings, it appears that many of these are decades old and not connected to the events that led to Petitioner’s suspension from the practice of law. The record demonstrates that Petitioner has taken remedial action to address and resolve these issues. Likewise, Petitioner forthrightly explained the Licenses and Inspections Code violations assessed against his rental property and his current appeal concerning his failure to have a rental license for a period of time. These matters are not indicative of a lack of competence or moral qualifications, as they have been explained fully and resolved by Petitioner.

Next, we address the referral fee issue. According to the record, Petitioner left service as a senior judge in 2017 and was placed on retired license status by the Attorney Registration Office on October 17, 2017. It appears Petitioner was not aware of his retired status and did not recall receiving the letter from the registration office. Acting under the belief that he was an active status lawyer, Petitioner referred two matters to Attorney McEldrew and later collected referral fees in the amount of \$8,666.66. Petitioner disclosed these fees on his Reinstatement Questionnaire. However, as a retired lawyer

ineligible to practice law in Pennsylvania, Petitioner was not permitted to refer cases and receive a referral fee. Attorney McEldrew credibly testified concerning the fees and explained that he checked with Petitioner about his status and Petitioner advised he was an active lawyer. Petitioner expressed confusion as to his attorney license status at the time of the referral and credibly testified he did not know he was on retired status. He also credibly acknowledged that he should not have referred the matter and collected the fees as a retired lawyer. While the record shows that Petitioner was not attentive to his attorney license status, we find this was not an egregious oversight that denotes a level of incompetence that should prevent his readmission.

The record supports the conclusion that Petitioner demonstrated rehabilitation from his criminal conduct and professional and moral fitness by accepting full responsibility for his actions, acknowledging the harm his misconduct inflicted on the legal profession, expressing contrition and sincere remorse, maintaining knowledge of the current law, and engaging in worthwhile community service. Petitioner compellingly established the strong support of community members, who convincingly demonstrated that Petitioner's return to practice will not be detrimental to the public or the profession.

Upon this record, we conclude that Petitioner has met his burden of proof that he is morally qualified, competent and learned in the law, and that his resumption of the practice of law within the Commonwealth will be neither detrimental to the integrity and standing of the bar nor subversive of the public interest. Petitioner has demonstrated clearly and convincingly that he is fit to practice law.

IV. RECOMMENDATION

The Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recommends that the Petitioner, Jimmie Moore, be reinstated to the practice of law.

The Board further recommends that, pursuant to Rule 218(f), Pa.R.D.E., Petitioner be directed to pay the necessary expenses incurred in the investigation and processing of the Petition for Reinstatement.

Respectfully submitted,

THE DISCIPLINARY BOARD OF THE  
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

By: \_\_\_\_\_

  
Joshua M. Bloom, Member

Date: 5-21-25

Chair Rafferty<sup>5</sup>, Vice-Chair Mundorff, and Members Mongeluzzi, Ellsworth, Alfano, O'Donnell and Neft join the majority.  
Members Senoff, Vance and Wilson dissent in favor of denying reinstatement.  
Member Dee recused.

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<sup>5</sup> This matter was adjudicated on October 25, 2024. The composition of the Board and its leadership at that time is reflected herein.

BEFORE THE DISCIPLINARY BOARD OF THE  
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

In the Matter of	:	No. 2608 Disciplinary Docket No. 3
	:	
	:	No. 87 DB 2019
JIMMIE MOORE	:	
	:	Attorney Registration No. 24513
	:	
PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT	:	(Philadelphia)

DISSENTING STATEMENT

A majority of the Board recommends that Petitioner be reinstated to the practice of law from a four year period of suspension. I respectfully dissent and recommend that Petitioner's Petition for Reinstatement be denied.

The Board must determine whether Petitioner has met his burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that he meets the reinstatement requirements set forth in Pa.R.D.E. 218(c)(3), specifically, that he presently has the moral qualifications, competency and learning in the law necessary to practice law in this Commonwealth. Here, Petitioner failed to demonstrate that he is qualified to resume the practice of law.

From the outset of the reinstatement process, Petitioner demonstrated clear competency issues. To seek reinstatement, a suspended attorney is required to complete the Reinstatement Questionnaire and "certif[y] that the foregoing responses are true and correct to the best of [their] knowledge, information, and belief." When omissions or errors are contained on the Reinstatement Questionnaire, the Board and Supreme Court have found that a petitioner's "inability to fill out a pre-printed questionnaire constitutes a competency problem," as the "practice of law requires enormous dedication and attention to detail." *In the Matter of Marvin F. Galfand*, No. 25 DB 2004 (D. Bd. Rpt. 5/2/2008, p.



9) (S. Ct. Order 11/5/2008); *Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Michael E. Davis*, 614 A.2d 116, 1123 (Pa. 1992) (Dissenting Opinion of Justice Cappy). Moreover, the Board has found that a petitioner's errors without a credible explanation are "not excusable and only compounds his overall appearance of incompetence and lack of fitness." *In the Matter of Anthony Richard Patete, Jr.*, No. 99 DB 2001 (D. Bd. Rpt. 10/21/2009, p. 16) (S. Ct. Order 12/29/2009).

Here, Petitioner failed to thoroughly and honestly answer significant parts of the Reinstatement Questionnaire, including:

- Self-employment at Matric Industries, which Petitioner incorporated to manage his real estate (NT II, 21);
- Self-employment at Red Oak Development (NT II, 135), which Petitioner incorporated to develop real estate (NT II, 22);
- Self-employment at Work Green Solutions, which Petitioner incorporated to develop environmental solutions to the community (NT II, 23-24);
- Self-employment at Longame Productions, which Petitioner incorporated to transform his novel into a movie/musical (NT II, 28);
- Self-employment at Jimmie Moore Consulting, in which Petitioner sold framed Nigerian Masks (NT II, 26-27, 137); and
- 38 lawsuits where Petitioner was a named party (NT II, 156, 160).

Petitioner further falsely certified that he had "No" "outstanding unpaid federal, state, or local individual income taxes and/or related business and/or payroll taxes" and that he had "No" "unsatisfied judgments or outstanding tax liens against

[him].”<sup>1</sup> Petitioner additionally falsely certified that he had no debts that are currently 90 days past due.<sup>2</sup> NT II, 132.

Petitioner’s omissions, coupled with his lack of due diligence in conducting a reasonable investigation into lawsuits where he was a named party, unpaid taxes, and outstanding liens, exhibit a significant lack of competency and disregard for the reinstatement process. Indeed, it was upon ODC’s investigation that this information was uncovered, as Petitioner admitted that he conducted “no research,” “erroneously omitted,” or “forgot or did not know of” information in response to the relevant questions. NT II, 104, 105, 133, 155-156, 173-174. On direct examination, Petitioner was questioned as to why he did not fully cooperate with ODC’s requests for further information related to the completion of the questionnaire. Petitioner indicated he “cooperated enough,” a level of cooperation his counsel suggested in “hindsight” was probably not sufficient. NT II, 10, 170; ODC-20. The fact that the Board now has what is hopefully a complete, truthful questionnaire is because of the due diligence and competency of ODC and is in spite of Petitioner’s disinterest and disregard for the application.

While Petitioner’s infractions on the application may not be egregious compared to his precipitating crimes, the reinstatement process demands a thorough application from a suspended attorney seeking reinstatement. The Court has denied reinstatement to petitioners who did not take the steps necessary to ensure a complete and accurate questionnaire. See *In the Matter of E. Nkem Odinkemere*, No. 129 DB 2005 (D. Bd. Rpt. 3/14/2012, p. 12) (S. Ct. Order 7/18/2012). Petitioner’s “erroneous omissions”

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<sup>1</sup> At the time Petitioner filed for reinstatement, court dockets listed two active unpaid Commonwealth tax liens against Locust Abstract, three active federal liens against Locust Abstract, and one unpaid tax lien against Petitioner and his law firm.

<sup>2</sup> At the time Petitioner filed for reinstatement, court dockets indicated that Petitioner had three open gas service liens.

were not purely technical in nature or insignificant honest mistakes. These omissions represented large swaths of missing information that were critical to inform those sitting in judgment of the reinstatement. Errors like those made by Petitioner are “not excusable” and constitute a competency problem. *Patete, supra*. Whether or not Petitioner was purposefully withholding the information from the process only makes an obvious fact worse.

It remains that Petitioner was woefully incompetent in his ability to successfully complete the Questionnaire. While Petitioner did resolve several of his outstanding legal issues and monetary obligations, he did so only at the prompting and assistance of ODC. If reinstated, Petitioner will not be afforded the luxury of assistance from opposing counsel to do the legal research necessary to appropriately and effectively represent his clients. Quite simply, if Petitioner is unable or unwilling to do the legal research to advocate for his own reinstatement to the bar, I cannot trust his ability to advocate for and provide competent representation to a client in need of a capable attorney.

Equally concerning is Petitioner’s lack of knowledge in relevant case law and rules. At several points throughout his hearing, Petitioner demonstrated he was unaware of current case law directly related to his own case. Petitioner’s understanding of the law during his own reinstatement hearing is an important fact to consider when determining whether he meets the stringent burden for reinstatement to the practice of law in the Commonwealth. *See In the Matter of Louis Alfred Piccone*, No. 102 DB 2018 (D. Bd. Rpt. 11/7/2023) (S. Ct. Order 1/23/2024).

When asked about why he did not settle his outstanding gas lien to the City of Philadelphia, Petitioner acknowledged that he was relying on outdated case law and

stated that he was not aware there was a recent court decision that required landlords to cover unpaid gas bills. Further evidencing his lack of understanding in the law is Petitioner's clear disregard for the Philadelphia Code, which requires the owner of a dwelling unit to obtain a rental license to legally collect rent.<sup>3</sup> Relevantly, Petitioner owns a four-unit rental property that has been fully occupied by renters for the last five years, despite Petitioner not holding a rental license since August 31, 2012. NT II, 110, 113-114, 125. In 2020, 2021, and two times in 2022, the City of Philadelphia's License and Inspections Appeal Board issued notices to Petitioner, informing him that he was in violation of the relevant Philadelphia Code. At the same time, Labor and Industry also imposed violations for Petitioner's failure to have his fire system inspected annually as mandated by the Philadelphia Fire Code, C-13-915. Petitioner knew that he was required to have a license to rent his property, and nonetheless failed to acquire the proper licenses. NT I, 301. As for the fire system, Petitioner claimed he was not aware that he had to have the fire alarm system inspected annually. NT II, 115, 117-118.

Notably, from April 1984 to January 2000, Petitioner was a member of the City of Philadelphia's Licenses and Inspections Appeal Board, which is tasked with adjudicating appeals of violations of the Philadelphia Code and its safety and building standards. NT II, 121-122. Petitioner's prior professional experience sitting on the L&I Appeal Board, as well as his own personal obligations to comply with the law as a landlord of a dwelling unit for which he leases and collects rent places his conduct in

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<sup>3</sup> Philadelphia Code, Chapter 9-3902(1), Rental Licenses:

(1) *Required.*

(a) The owner of any dwelling unit, multiple family dwelling, rooming house, dormitory, hotel, one-family dwelling, two-family dwelling, or rooming unit let for occupancy must obtain a rental license. No person shall collect rent with respect to any property that is required to be licensed pursuant to this Section unless a valid rental license has been issued for the property.

question and suggests a lack of competency in both knowing and following the law.

During his reinstatement hearing, Petitioner demonstrated a concerning lack of familiarity with his attorney license status after leaving the bench. He believed he was an active attorney, but in reality was on retired status. Under the Enforcement Rules, a retired status attorney is not eligible to practice law. See Pa.R.D.E. 102. During his period of retirement when he was ineligible to practice law, Petitioner improperly referred two cases to Attorney McEldrew and collected referral fees. At Petitioner's hearing, Attorney McEldrew credibly testified that he specifically requested Petitioner's attorney status. NT I, 232. Petitioner, however, failed to inform Mr. McEldrew of his true status, which resulted in payment of the improper referral fees. NT I, 231. Petitioner acknowledged the mistake. While Petitioner's explanation that he would not have accepted referral fees had he known he was on retired status is dubious given his request to change his attorney license status from "Retired" to "Active," the more concerning fact is that he admitted he was unaware that he was not able to refer cases and later collect referral fees as a retired attorney. NT II, 94. This is yet another example of Petitioner's overall lack of competence and knowledge required for reinstatement.

Further disconcerting is that Petitioner's testimony during the reinstatement hearing directly conflicts with representations his former counsel made to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court during oral argument at Petitioner's disciplinary hearing. Before the Court, Petitioner's counsel, at the time, stated that Petitioner "does not intend to practice law again" and that Petitioner may wish to do some community law service but "certainly not the private practice of law." NT II, 146-147, 148. Under questioning at his reinstatement hearing, Petitioner did not dispute his then-attorney's representations, despite indicating on his Questionnaire that he now intends to resume a civil practice of

law.

Throughout the reinstatement hearing, however, Petitioner gave a panoply of positions on what his true intentions are when it comes to his potential return to the practice of law. Petitioner indicated he wants the ability to have a license to practice but that he is not going to assume a full practice. He further indicated that he is not in great health and is “not going to try to open up a law office, law practice, full staff, taxes and all that stuff.” N.T. II 150. Petitioner elaborated on his life goals, explaining that he wants to fish when he wants to, write his book when he wants to, and stroll the streets when he wants to but would like the ability to take on “certain cases.” N.T. II 151. Petitioner indicated he does not “want to go into the courtroom” or “want a whole lot of responsibility in terms of practice.” N.T. II, 172. Petitioner’s counsel at the hearing further crystallized the confusion over his client’s career goals by simply stating that “right now he wants to just fool around with it a little.”

At the conclusion of the hearing, the Chair of the Hearing Committee focused his attention on the representations made before the Supreme Court during oral argument in Petitioner’s disciplinary matter and his conflicting testimony at the reinstatement hearing, pointedly asking counsel how it would impact a reinstatement hearing. Additionally, the Chair queried whether there can be limitations imposed on the type or scope of Petitioner’s practice should his license be restored. Petitioner’s counsel answered that there cannot be conditions or limitations imposed by the Committee or Board and that the question is an “all or nothing” proposition—either Petitioner is “fit to come back” or not.

In this respect, I concur with the way Petitioner’s counsel framed the issue before us. It is the Board’s responsibility to determine whether Petitioner is fit to resume

the practice of law or not—“all or nothing.” It is my strong belief that Petitioner has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he has the competency, moral qualifications and learning in the law to resume the practice of law in this Commonwealth.

At bottom, a law license is a privilege, not a right—a privilege that, here, was suspended by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. There is a “stringent standard for reinstatement in this Commonwealth.” *In the Matter of Jon Ari Lefkowitz*, No. 125 DB 2018 (D. Bd. Rpt. 1/3/2022, p. 35) (S. Ct. Order 4/1/2022). It is the responsibility of the Board to recommend whether that privilege should be reinstated.

David Ramsay, who served both as a field surgeon during the American Revolution and as a delegate to the Continental Congress from South Carolina, made an observation two centuries ago that rings just as true today: “No order of men has, in all ages, been more favorable to liberty, than lawyers.” David Ramsay, *The History of the American Revolution*, ed. Lester H. Cohen (Philadelphia: R. Aitken, 1789; Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1990). The vast majority of Pennsylvanians are not lawyers and rely on competent counsel to represent their legal interests. These are serious interests where individuals’ lives and livelihoods are at stake and should not be represented by someone just looking to “fool around” with his license. Petitioner successfully served his sentence for the federal crimes he committed and has every right to enjoy the pursuits of retirement, such as fishing and book writing. However, the practice of law should not be tantamount to a retirement recreation.

I cannot in good conscience recommend that Petitioner is competent enough or has the sufficient learning of the law to adequately represent a client’s legal interests or conclude that his resumption of the practice of law would neither be detrimental to the integrity and standing of the bar or the administration of justice nor

subversive of the public interest.

Respectfully submitted,

By: s/Joshua F. Wilson  
Joshua F. Wilson, Member

Date: May 21, 2025

Members Senoff and Vance join this dissenting statement.