BEFORE THE DISCIPLINARY BOARD OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL	:	
Petitioner	:	
	:	No. 5 DB 2024
v.	:	
	:	Attorney Registration No. 82452
JASON E. FINE	:	
Respondent	:	(Philadelphia)

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 20th day of February, 2025, in accordance with Rule 215(g), Pa.R.D.E., the three-member Panel of the Disciplinary Board having reviewed and approved the Joint Petition in Support of Discipline on Consent filed in the above captioned matter; it is

ORDERED that JASON E. FINE, be subjected to a **PUBLIC REPRIMAND** by the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania as provided in Rule 204(a) and Rule 205(c)(9) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement.

BY THE BOARD:

Board Chair

TRUE COPY FROM RECORD
Attest:

Marcee D. Sloan
Board Prothonotary
The Disciplinary Board of the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

BEFORE THE DISCIPLINARY BOARD OF THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL,	:	No. 5 DB 2024
Petitioner	:	ODC File No. C1-22-389
v.	:	Attorney Reg. No. 82452
JASON E. FINE,	:	
Respondent	:	(Philadelphia County)

JOINT PETITION IN SUPPORT OF DISCIPLINE ON CONSENT PURSUANT TO Pa.R.D.E. 215(d)

Petitioner, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (hereinafter, "ODC") by Thomas J. Farrell, Chief Disciplinary Counsel, and Ramona Mariani, Disciplinary Counsel and Jason E. Fine, Esquire (hereinafter "Respondent"), by and through his counsel, Carson B. Morris, Esquire, respectfully petition the Disciplinary Board in support of discipline on consent, pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Disciplinary Enforcement ("Pa.R.D.E.") 215(d), and in support thereof state:

1. ODC, whose principal office is situated at Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel, Pennsylvania Judicial Center, Suite 2700, 601 Commonwealth Avenue, P.O. Box 62485, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17106, is invested, pursuant to Pa.R.D.E. 207, with the power and duty to investigate all matters involving alleged misconduct of an attorney admitted

to practice law in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and to prosecute all disciplinary proceedings brought in accordance with the various provisions of the aforesaid Enforcement Rules.

2. Respondent was born in 1972 and was admitted to practice law in the Commonwealth on November 9, 1998. Respondent is on active status and his last registered address is 8 Penn Center, 1628 JFK Blvd. Ste. 2120, Philadelphia, Pa 19103. Respondent is subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court.

SPECIFIC FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS ADMITTED

3. Jason E. Fine, Esquire (hereinafter "Respondent") is the principal and named partner of J. Fine Law, a personal injury/accident firm located in Philadelphia.

4. Respondent represented client Beatrice Rosario in connection with a June, 2018 automobile accident.

5. On or around May 5, 2022, Ms. Rosario went to Respondent's office:

a. Ms. Rosario explained that she was experiencing financial difficulties while waiting for her settlement.

6. Respondent arranged for Ms. Rosario to receive a loan from VFS, Inc. ("VFS"), located in Albert Lea, Minnesota, in the amount of $1,500 on that day.

7. Because Ms. Rosario expressed an urgent need for the loan proceeds, Respondent advanced to Ms. Rosario his personal check in the amount of $1,500 and handwrote an addendum on the Lien Purchase Agreement ("LPA") between Ms. Rosario and VFS, which memorialized the fact that Respondent had advanced the funds because the check from VFS had not yet been received.

8. At the time Ms. Rosario took the VFS advance, the defendant had made an offer to settle Ms. Rosario's case for $30,000; and on Ms. Rosario's instructions, Respondent had countered for $40,000. Thus, while it seemed clear the case would settle, and Ms. Rosario was aware of the prospective settlement, a settlement had not been finalized.

9. The LPA with VFS, provided, among other things, that:

   a. VFS Inc. "paid" $1,500 "in return for an interest in, and lien against the Proceeds."

   b. "You [Ms. Rosario] hereby agree that your attorney is NOT recommending that you accept this lien purchase and that this is an advance on your accident case and has high fees."

c. "All claims litigated outside Philadelphia county, Pa., will be assessed a 20% surcharge. Amount assessed $0.00"

d. Fine Law Group, could take a $150 "processing fee" for any advance request;

e. Ms. Rosario would owe VFS "$2,200.00 + surcharge + $90.00 processing fee if claim is paid within 180 days of this agreement;" and

f. the agreement would be "governed and construed in accordance with the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania."

10. The LPA is a two-page contract between the client, in this case Ms. Rosario, and VFS. It included an Attorney and Law Firm Acknowledgement as a separate addendum signed by Respondent and Ms. Rosario, for the benefit and protection of VFS's lien.

11. Less than twenty days later Ms. Rosario's case settled and on May 24, 2022, Respondent provided Ms. Rosario with a Confidential Agreement and General Release of all claims from the defendants releasing all claims for an agreed to amount.

12. Ms. Rosario's settlement was reduced by, among other things, $2,290, representing the litigation advance and processing fee due to VFS. Respondent waived the $150.00 processing fee he was entitled to under the VFS LPA.

13. Even before her case settled, Ms. Rosario was troubled by the terms of the VFS advance; on or around May 11, 2022, she met with a representative from the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General ("OAG") who memorialized her complaint in a memorandum.

14. The OAG took no action on the matter but shortly thereafter referred the complaint to ODC.

15. Among other things, the OAG noted that it appeared that VFS was a trucking company owned by Warren Amundson.

16. ODC's investigation revealed that Warren Amundson is Respondent's father-in-law.

17. The VFS LPA did not disclose the relationship between Respondent and Mr. Amundson.

18. Respondent did not disclose the relationship between he and Mr. Amundson to Ms. Rosario, either in a separate document or orally.

19. In ODC's Letter Seeking a Statement of Respondent's Position (hereinafter "DB-7 letter") ODC charged that Respondent's conduct violated two conflicts rules: RPC 1.7(a)(2) and 1.8(e).

20. In his response to ODC's DB-7 letter, Respondent took the following positions:

a. he routinely advises his clients against entering into litigation funding agreements;

b. he generally provides clients with three options for lenders depending upon the client's needs;

c. as far as he understood, the fees and interest rates charged by VFS are among the lowest available to potential litigants;

d. he denied drafting the LPA or advising Mr. Amundson or VFS about its terms;

e. he has no pecuniary or ownership interest in VFS or the proceeds of its litigation liens; and

f. VFS is not Respondent's former or current client.

21. Respondent argued that no conflict existed with respect to the VFS advances, which was why the relationship with Mr. Amundson was not disclosed.

22. In support, he raised two legal arguments based on Bar Association opinions and the comments to RPC 1.7:

a. Relying on the Philadelphia Bar Association's Professional Guidance Committee and the Pennsylvania Bar Association Committee on Legal Ethics and

Professional Responsibility opinions[1], which focus on whether an attorney holds a financial interest in a lending company when determining the presence of a possible conflict, Respondent stated he had no financial interest in VFS and also that VFS was not his client; and

b. Based on Comment 11 to RPC 1.7 Respondent argued he had no personal conflict because Mr. Amundson was not a "parent, child, sibling or spouse" and that parents-in-law do not otherwise constitute "close personal relationships" under RPC 1.7.

23. Respondent explained, and provided supporting documentation, that with respect to Ms. Rosario:

a. her case had not reached final settlement at the time she accepted the VFS loan;

b. when he provided her with the funds in advance she had expressed a pressing need for funds and did not want to return to his office;

[1] Philadelphia Committee Opinion 91-9; Philadelphia Committee Opinion 99-8; Pennsylvania Bar Committee Formal Opinion 2005-100.

c. when the case settled, Respondent voluntarily reduced his fee from 33% to 25% resulting in an additional payment to Ms. Rosario of $3,200; and

d. Respondent did not charge Ms. Rosario the $150 processing fee under the VFS LPA.

24. Although Respondent denied that he engaged in a conflict of interest, he offered to disclose his relationship with Mr. Amundson to his clients in the future because ODC had expressed concerns about the relationship.

25. Respondent cooperated with ODC's investigation. ODC sought a list of all clients Respondent referred to VFS on or after September 15, 2018; the signed, dated LPA; and distribution sheets to the extent the case(s) had settled or otherwise resolved.

26. Respondent provided a list reflecting 174 clients and 1,823 pages of documents over more than a four-year period.

27. ODC reviewed the documents and sought additional documents and clarification from Respondent, all of which he provided.

28. On May 1, 2024, ODC sent Respondent a DB-7A letter setting forth additional facts.

29. ODC's review of various records produced with respect to the 174 clients Petitioner referred to VFS revealed one instance where Respondent favored Mr. Amundson's interests over that of his client.

30. Respondent represented client CH with respect to two personal injury matters, an automobile accident and an assault claim.

31. Client CH received a total of five litigation loans, three of which were from VFS.

32. The VFS loans were all provided against the assault matter and not the automobile case.

33. The automobile case settled.

34. Respondent obtained a default judgment in the assault case but was unable to enforce or collect the judgment.

35. Respondent proposed settling a portion of the VFS loans against the automobile case, thus placing Mr. Amundson's interest ahead of that of his client.

36. Client CH refused to agree to Respondent's proposal; which refusal Respondent accepted.

37. Respondent acknowledged that by the foregoing conduct, he did not "completely and faithfully fulfil his duty of loyalty" to CH, that he failed to appreciate the conflict at the time, and that his actions in this

instance were not indicative of how he represents his clients, including with respect to litigation loans.

38. Review of the records revealed that, as in Ms. Rosario's case, Respondent provided cash advances to an additional 23 clients in connection with VFS funding. The amounts advanced by Respondent ranged from $500 to $1500, and as in Ms. Rosario's case, no more than a few days elapsed between Respondent's advance and his receipt of the VFS funds.

39. Respondent admitted that he provided the advances, and explained that he:

a. only did so for clients who expressed a pressing need for cash to assist them in difficult circumstances;

b. derived no profit by providing the advances to his clients;

c. did so out of sympathy and a desire to assist the clients; and

d. has since discontinued this practice.

40. ODC requested Respondent provide more specific responses with respect to VFS and Mr. Amundson, specifically alleging that VFS only provided litigation funding through Respondent's firm, relying on, among other things: (a) the processing fee payable to Respondent; (b) that the

agreement is enforceable under the laws of Pennsylvania, where Respondent primarily practices rather than in Minnesota, where VFS is incorporated; and (c) the VFS provision for a "surcharge" for litigation outside of Philadelphia, a provision not present in other funding agreements reviewed by ODC.

41. In response, Respondent acknowledged that it was his understanding that VFS only originated funding through his firm but explained that if the client's case moved to another firm the VFS contract moved with the case. By way of further response, Respondent indicated his understanding that the 20% surcharge for litigation outside of Philadelphia was added because non-Philadelphia filed cases typically take longer to settle, and rather than adjusting the amount owed if paid after 365 days, VFS added the surcharge. Respondent further explained, and records he produced reflected, that he only files a small percentage of cases outside of Philadelphia and even in those cases, the 20% surcharge was often waived.

42. Review revealed that many of Respondent's clients had more than one personal injury claim and had taken litigation funding from several companies, including VFS.

43. In many, but not all, VFS funding advances, Respondent waived the processing fee the contract permitted him to charge.

44. Respondent also voluntarily reduced his fee on more than one occasion to the benefit of his clients.

45. On occasion, Respondent negotiated with the litigation funders, including VFS, to reduce his clients' repayment obligations.

46. After receipt of ODC's DB-7A Letter, Respondent voluntarily discontinued using and/or suggesting VFS to his clients as a source for litigation funding because of ODC's concerns regarding the practice. Respondent discontinued the practice of providing personal advances to clients prior to receipt of the litigation funds after receipt of ODC's first DB-7 Letter.

SPECIFIC RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT VIOLATED

By his conduct as described in Paragraphs 3-46. Respondent admits he violated the following Rules of Professional Conduct:

A. 1.7(a)(2) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if: there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.

B. 1.8(e) A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation, except that: a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter; and, a lawyer representing an indigent client may pay court costs and expenses of litigation on behalf of the client.

SPECIFIC JOINT RECOMMENDATION FOR DISCIPLINE

A. Discussion

Respondent initially stated his belief that VFS provided more favorable terms for his clients than other litigation funders. Respondent also acknowledged in his response to ODC's DB-7A that he "is not and does not purport to be an expert on litigation lending, the rate offered by other lending companies, or how they compare to VFS's LPAs." ODC has been unable to verify whether the terms of VFS loans are, in fact, more favorable than other litigation funders for the reasons described in more detail in this section.

Third-Party litigation funding has experienced explosive growth in the United States, with little oversight or regulation. On the federal level its prevalence has resulted in congressional interest, but to date no specific legislative action. **See** Josh Landau, *Congress Refocuses on Third-Party Litigation Funding Transparency*, www.patentprogress.org/2024/08

(describing third-party litigation funding as a "rapidly-growing industry with opaque business practices that have raised serious concerns on Capital Hill and beyond."). In a December 2022 Report to Congressional Requesters, the United States Government Accountability Office ("GAO") issued a report titled Third-Party Litigation Financing: Market Characteristics, Data, and Trends (the "Report"). **See** U.S. Gov't Accountability Off. Gao-23-105210, *Third-Party Litigation Financing: Market Characteristics, Data, and Trends* (2022). The Report identifies two types of financing: Commercial and Consumer third-party litigation funding ("TPLF"). The instant case solely involves Consumer TPLF, which the Report describes as "arrangements ... between a funder and an individual person, such as the plaintiff in a personal injury case." Consumer TPLF is currently not regulated under federal law. According to the GAO Report, as of December 2022, only 10 states had enacted any regulations relating to consumer TPLF. Pennsylvania was not identified as one of those states.[2]

Notably, much of the information in the Report was gleaned from voluntary participation by various TPLF funders. The GAO requested examples of litigation funding agreements from twelve lenders. Only six

[2] There are multiple articles that discuss the drawbacks and benefits of TPLF. These are not addressed in this Consent Petition. Among other things, ODC regulates lawyers not lenders or financiers. There are also numerous Bar Association Opinions that address the potential ethical issues arising from TPLF.

complied. Those six redacted relevant data, such as investment returns, fees, and funding amounts. ***Id.*** at pg. 2, fn 4. The lack of transparency and standards in TPLF renders meaningful comparison between the various funding companies difficult if not impossible. In those states that have some form of regulation, the accrual (interest) rates may be capped (Arkansas, Tennessee, Nevada, West Virginia); some require repayments amounts to be stated at set periods up to 42 months total; some require that the rate of return should be stated per annum or semi-annually; and some limit the length of time in which the advance accrues. ***Id.*** Appendix 3.

ODC's review of the litigation funding agreements supplied through Respondent's voluntary discovery suggest that where the loan was short-term, as in Ms. Rosario's matter, the VFS advance averaged an accrual rate of nearly 50%, which was higher than the rates disclosed by four other litigation funders, which ranged from 27% to 41.75%.[3] Conversely, the VFS advance stopped accruing after 365 days, thus any long term loan with VFS would almost certainly result in lower charges than a loan with other lenders. While some comparisons could be made based on the information

[3] The four other contracts referenced here were contained in Respondent's document production to ODC. The VFS LPA does not disclose any accrual (interest rate) rate, although the amounts due within 180 days, after 181 days and after 365 days are specifically set forth in each VFS LPA. Respondent produced additional contracts with litigation funders in response to the DB-7A. At least one of those contracts had a rate potentially higher than the VFS rate calculated by ODC.

provided, without knowing the specific terms each TPLF offered at specific points in time, it is impossible to render accurate analysis.

B. ODC and Respondent Jointly Recommend that the Appropriate Discipline for Respondent's Admitted Misconduct is a Public Reprimand

Disciplinary cases involving conflicts of interest run the gamut from private discipline to lengthy suspensions. There are several public reprimand cases which involve, as is the case here, a personal conflict of interest.[4] The Board recently administered a summary public reprimand in a conflict case involving a litigation funder, albeit the fact pattern was very different, and involved additional aggravating facts, from that presented in Respondent's case. ***See Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Michael J. O'Neill***, No. 134 DB 2023 (10/5/2023). The Board found that O'Neill engaged in a conflict of interest when he obtained three separate high interest personal loans from two different TPLF companies secured against an anticipated referral fee. O'Neill revealed confidential information relating to the representation of the client without the client's knowledge or informed consent. O'Neill further failed to inform the client or his law firm of the

[4] The primary issue here is the conflict due to the relationship between Respondent and Mr. Amundson. ODC concedes that it has no evidence of financial benefit to Respondent, other than the processing fee, which was disclosed on the LPA, and frequently waived by Respondent. ODC does not contend that provision is unique, having seen at least one other TPLF contract from a different company that provided a similar fee to the attorney.

loans and obtain their consent. The Board found the litigation loans violated both RPC 1.7(a)(2) and RPC 1.8(a)(1)-(3). Nonetheless, the Board found a public reprimand appropriate noting, among other things, that O'Neill cooperated with ODC, expressed remorse and had no history of discipline. ***Id.*** at 3.

In ***Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Richard G. Scheib***, No. 159 DB 2021 (3/4/2022) the Board imposed a public reprimand for Scheib's misconduct in drafting a will for an elderly client that named Scheib and his paralegal as testamentary beneficiaries, resulting in violations of numerous Rules including Rules 1.7(a)(2) and 1.8(c). The will also named Scheib as executor and his paralegal as alternative. Scheib drafted two acknowledgements signed by the client. The first stated Scheib had advised the client that a different attorney should draft the will, but the client refused. The second stated that Scheib had advised the client the bequest should go to the client's sister, but the client refused that advice. These acknowledgements were not separately signed by witnesses, notarized, or filed with the Register of Wills. After the client's death, and **after** being notified by an attorney for the client's sister of their concerns, Scheib disclaimed his inheritance. Scheib had no history of discipline.

In ***Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Richard E. Bower,*** No. 115 DB 2022 (9/16/2022) the Disciplinary Board imposed a public reprimand for Bower's violation of RPC 1.7(a)(2) and 8.4(d). Bower, the District Attorney in Fayette County, appointed a local Fayette County attorney to prosecute criminal charges against Bower's adult son instead of referring the matter to the Pennsylvania Office of the Attorney General (OAG). The local attorney withdrew certain charges and offered Bower's son ARD. After news outlets issued public reports about the matter, the OAG stated Bower should, by law, have referred the case to its office. Thereafter, Bower made the referral to the OAG. In mitigation, respondent Bower had no history of discipline.

A number of cases have resulted in license suspensions. Those cases are distinguishable from the instant case, in that they involve respondents who failed to voluntarily take remedial action and clearly and improperly profited from their misconduct. For example, in ***Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Mary Ellen Tomasco,*** No. 111 DB 2004 (D. Bd. Rpt. 11/22/2005) (S. Ct. Order 3/10/2006) the Pennsylvania Supreme Court suspended Tomasco for one year and one day. Tomasco took financial advantage of her position as a fiduciary for an elderly, incapacitated client, by using the client's money to fund Tomasco's purchase of a New Mexico

property. Tomasco documented the "mortgage", but as of the date of the disciplinary proceedings she still not properly recorded it. She acknowledged that the mortgage was unsecured but took the position that there was no ethical issue as she had made most monthly payments. In ***Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Glenn D. McGogney,*** No. 194 DB 2009 (D. Bd. Rpt. ; Sup. Ct. Order 3/28/2012) the Supreme Court disbarred McGogney where, among other things, he solicited a loan from a current client which he falsely claimed was secured by a first lien position in a liquor license for a restaurant/bar/ strip club in which McGogney was a part-owner/investor. McGogney never repaid his client.

Mitigating factors in this case include:

a. Respondent has no history of discipline in over 25 years of practice;

b. Respondent has fully cooperated with ODC;

c. Respondent has accepted responsibility as demonstrated by entering into this Petition; and

d. Respondent voluntarily discontinued use of VFS and no longer provides advances to clients prior to receipt of funds from the TPLF.

Finally, as discussed in section A, it does not appear that Respondent's clients were financially harmed by the use of VFS versus another TPLF. In addition, as acknowledged in Paragraph 44 above, in the cases reviewed by ODC Respondent on occasion voluntarily reduced his contingency fee and waived processing fees to the financial benefit of his clients. That does not excuse Respondent's conflict in failing to disclose the relationship. But the lack of prejudice caused to the client is a relevant factor to consider when weighing the degree of discipline.

WHEREFORE, Petitioner and Respondent respectfully request that, pursuant to Pennsylvania Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement 215(e), 215(g) and 215(i), a three member panel of the Disciplinary Board review and approve the Joint Petition in Support of Discipline on Consent and Order that Respondent receive a Public Reprimand and pay the necessary expenses incurred in the investigation and prosecution of this matter.

Respectfully submitted,

OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL
THOMAS J. FARRELL,
Chief Disciplinary Counsel

1/9/25
DATE

Ramona M. Mariani
Ramona M. Mariani
Disciplinary Counsel-in-Charge

Office of Disciplinary Counsel
District I
1601 Market Street, Suite 3320
Philadelphia, PA 19103
(215) 560-6296

1/9/2025
DATE

Jason Eric Fine, Esquire
Respondent

1/9/25
DATE

Carson B. Morris, Esquire
Counsel for Respondent

BEFORE THE DISCIPLINARY BOARD OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL, Petitioner	:	No. DB 2024
	:	ODC File No. C1-22-389
v.	:	
	:	Attorney Reg. No. 82452
JASON ERIC FINE, Respondent	:	(Philadelphia)

AFFIDAVIT UNDER RULE 215(d), Pa.R.D.E.

Respondent, Jason Eric Fine being duly sworn according to law, deposes and hereby submits this affidavit consenting to the recommendation of a Public Reprimand in conformity with Pa.R.D.E. 215(d) and further states as follows:

1. He is an attorney admitted in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, having been admitted to the bar on or about November 9, 1998.

2. He desires to submit a Joint Petition in Support of Discipline on Consent Pursuant to Pa.R.D.E. 215(d).

3. His consent is freely and voluntarily rendered; he is not being subjected to coercion or duress, and he is fully aware of the implications of

submitting this affidavit.

4. He is aware that there is presently pending a proceeding into allegations that he has been guilty of misconduct as set forth in the Joint Petition in Support of Discipline on Consent Pursuant to Pa.R.D.E. 215(d) to which this affidavit is attached.

5. He acknowledges that the material facts set forth in the Joint Petition are true.

6. He submits the within affidavit because he knows that if charges predicated upon the matter under investigation were filed, or continued to be prosecuted in the pending proceeding, he could not successfully defend against them.

7. He acknowledges that he is fully aware of his right to consult and employ counsel to represent him in the instant proceeding. He has retained, consulted and acted upon the advice of counsel, in connection with his decision to execute the within Joint Petition.

It is understood that the statements made herein are subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S.A. §4904 (relating to unsworn falsification to authorities).

Signed this 9 day of January, 2025

Name

Sworn to and subscribed
before me this 9th day
of January 2025

Notary Public

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania - Notary Seal
ASHLEY ROSADO - Notary Public
Philadelphia County
My Commission Expires May 4, 2027
Commission Number 1432863

BEFORE THE DISCIPLINARY BOARD OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL,	:	No. DB 2024
Petitioner	:	ODC File No. C1-22-389
v.	:	
	:	Attorney Reg. No. 82452
JASON ERIC FINE,	:	
Respondent	:	(Philadelphia)

VERIFICATION

The statements contained in the foregoing *Joint Petition In Support of Discipline on Consent Discipline* are true and correct to the best of my knowledge or information and belief and are made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S.A. §4904, relating to unsworn falsification to authorities.

1/9/25
DATE

Ramona M. Mariani
Disciplinary Counsel-in-Charge

1/9/2025
DATE

Jason Eric Fine, Esquire
Respondent

1/9/25
DATE

Carson B. Morris, Esquire
Counsel for Respondent

BEFORE THE DISCIPLINARY BOARD OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL, Petitioner	:	No. DB 2024
	:	ODC File No. C1-22-389
v.	:	
	:	Attorney Reg. No. 82452
JASON ERIC FINE, Respondent	:	(Philadelphia)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am this day serving the foregoing document upon all parties of record in this proceeding in accordance with the requirements of 204 Pa. Code §89.22 (relating to service by a participant).

First Class and Email, as follows:

Carson B. Morris, Esquire
Montgomery McCracken Walker & Rhoads
1735 Market Street, FL 21
Philadelphia, PA 19103
cmorris@mmwr.com

Dated: 1/10/25

Ramona M. Mariani, Esquire
Disciplinary Counsel-in-Charge
Office of Disciplinary Counsel
District I Office
1601 Market Street, Suite 3320
Philadelphia, PA 19103
(215) 560-6296

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I certify that this filing complies with the provisions of the *Public Access Policy of the Unified Judicial System of Pennsylvania: Case Records of the Appellate and Trial Courts* that require filing confidential information and documents differently than non-confidential information and documents.

Submitted by: Office of Disciplinary Counsel

Signature: 

Name: Ramona Mariani, Disciplinary Counsel-in-Charge

Attorney No. (if applicable): 78466