

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Sajarvin Williams,	:	SEALED CASE
Petitioner	:	
	:	
v.	:	
	:	
Pennsylvania Superior Court,	:	
Pennsylvania State Police, Chester	:	
County Court of Common Pleas,	:	
Chester County District Attorney's	:	
Office, Chester County Children,	:	
Youth, & Families, Chester County	:	
Intermediate Unit, Archdiocese of	:	
Philadelphia, Office of Education,	:	
Nefertiti Jordan, Esquire, Ashley	:	
Eckert, Esquire, and Stefanie	:	
Williams,	:	No. 250 M.D. 2025
Respondents	:	Submitted: June 16, 2026

BEFORE: HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
HONORABLE STELLA M. TSAI, Judge
HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE TSAI

FILED: September 29, 2026

Before the Court are preliminary objections filed by the Pennsylvania Superior Court (Superior Court), Pennsylvania State Police (PSP), Chester County Court of Common Pleas (Common Pleas), Chester County District Attorney's Office (DAO), Chester County Children, Youth, & Families (CYF), Chester County Intermediate Unit (CCIU), Ashley Eckert, Esquire, and Stefanie Williams (Respondent Williams) (collectively, Objecting Respondents) to the *pro se* petition for review (Petition) in the nature of a complaint filed in our original jurisdiction by

Sajarvin Williams (Petitioner). Petitioner’s allegations primarily relate to his involvement in divorce, custody, and support proceedings with Respondent Williams, his ex-wife, as well as reports of suspected child abuse against Petitioner that were determined to be unfounded under the Child Protective Services Law (CPSL).¹ Also before the Court are two applications for relief filed by Petitioner requesting that this Court order a law enforcement investigation of the child abuse reports and amend the designation of those reports from “unfounded” to “false.” Upon review, we sustain PSP’s preliminary objection concerning this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction over this action and transfer this matter to Common Pleas for disposition of the pending applications for relief and remaining preliminary objections.

I. PETITION

On July 10, 2025, Petitioner filed the Petition in this Court against Objecting Respondents, the Archdiocese of Philadelphia, Office of Education (Archdiocese), and Nefertiti Jordan, Esquire (collectively, Respondents). The Petition avers as follows.² Petitioner is employed as a school administrator in Chester County, Pennsylvania. Petition at 2 (unnumbered). Petitioner and Respondent Williams, who teaches at a school in Delaware, married in 2012. *Id.* Petitioner and Respondent Williams have three minor children born of the marriage (Children), who attend a school administered by the Archdiocese in West Grove, Pennsylvania (School). *Id.*

A divorce complaint was filed in 2015, but Petitioner and Respondent Williams reconciled. *Id.* After the couple separated in June 2020, a second divorce

¹ 23 Pa. C.S. §§ 6301-6388.

² When addressing preliminary objections, the Court must accept as true all well-pleaded material facts in the petition for review and all inferences reasonably deducible therefrom. *Torres v. Beard*, 997 A.2d 1242, 1245 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010).

complaint was filed, which resulted in the entry of a divorce decree in April 2022. *Id.* Petitioner moved out of the marital home by agreement and commenced a child custody action in Common Pleas in 2022. *Id.* After a custody trial in 2023, a Common Pleas judge awarded Respondent Williams primary physical custody of Children. *Id.* Petitioner and Respondent Williams have also been involved in litigation in Common Pleas relating to support and Protection from Abuse Act³ matters. Petition at 2. Furthermore, School staff submitted four reports to ChildLine⁴ alleging Petitioner abused Children; after investigation, CYF determined that the reports were unfounded. *Id.* at 2, ¶¶ 1-3, 6.

Petitioner seeks compensatory and punitive damages from Respondents based on the following claims brought against all Respondents: “violations of Law 23 Pa.,^[5] [Petitioner’s] 14th Amendment rights, Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,^[6] defamation of character, obstruction of justice, and discrimination.” *Id.* ¶¶ 4, 10, 18, 23, 25, 28, 31, 42, 48, 59, 72, 79 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). We summarize the allegations and claims asserted against PSP, Superior Court, and Common Pleas (Commonwealth Respondents), the Commonwealth government parties who form the basis of this Court’s exercise of original jurisdiction over this matter. *See* 42 Pa. C.S. § 761(a)(1) (providing that this Court shall exercise original jurisdiction over civil actions against the Commonwealth government, subject to

³ 23 Pa. C.S. §§ 6101-6122.

⁴ ChildLine is a unit of the Department of Human Services that operates a statewide toll-free system for receiving and maintaining reports of suspected child abuse and referring the reports for investigation. 55 Pa. Code § 3490.4.

⁵ Petitioner appears to be referencing Title 23 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, the Domestic Relations Code. *See* 23 Pa. C.S. §§ 101-8415.

⁶ Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 is the Fair Housing Act. *See* 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631.

certain specified exceptions); *see also* 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 102, 301 (defining Commonwealth government to include courts of the unified judicial system, which include Superior Court and courts of common pleas); *Konyk v. Pa. State Police*, 183 A.3d 981, 986 (Pa. 2018) (stating that a civil action against PSP is against the Commonwealth government).

A. Averments in Petition Relating to PSP

Petitioner avers that he contacted Lieutenant Daniel Steele of PSP to report that Respondent Williams, School, and CCIU coerced a child to make a false claim of child abuse, but PSP refused to investigate. Petition ¶ 19. Petitioner attempted to contact Lieutenant Steele’s supervisors to report the lack of investigation, “but PSP became non-responsive.” *Id.* ¶ 20. Petitioner subpoenaed Trooper Daniel Sheridan to testify regarding the investigation of potential child abuse, but Trooper Sheridan testified that Trooper Sperazza⁷ commenced the investigation. *Id.* ¶ 21. Petitioner contends that Trooper Sperazza is friends with Respondent Williams and initiated the investigation as a favor to her and passed the investigation off to Trooper Sheridan “in an effort to remain hidden.” *Id.* PSP interviewed two of Petitioner’s Children during its investigation but did not record the interviews. *Id.* ¶ 22. In addition to the causes of action asserted against all Respondents, Petitioner brings claims against PSP of “parental alienation, assisting with the evasion of Trooper Sperazza, and not recording child[]interviews.” *Id.* ¶ 23 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

B. Averments in Petition Relating to Superior Court

The allegations in the Petition pertaining to the Superior Court focus on two of that court’s decisions: an October 16, 2024 memorandum opinion affirming the

⁷ The Petition does not state Trooper Sperazza’s first name.

custody order that granted Respondent Williams primary physical custody of Children and an October 31, 2024 memorandum opinion affirming an order in the custody proceeding that resolved contempt and emergency petitions filed by Petitioner and Respondent Williams. *Id.* ¶¶ 43-47; *see Williams v. Williams* (Pa. Super., No. 793 EDA 2024, filed Oct. 31, 2024), 2024 WL 4635457, *appeal denied*, 333 A.3d 1036 (Pa. 2025); *Williams v. Williams* (Pa. Super., No. 2528 EDA 2023, filed Oct. 16, 2024), 2024 WL 4502882, *appeal denied*, 333 A.3d 1036 (Pa. 2025). According to the Petition, the Honorable Megan Sullivan of Superior Court, a former Assistant District Attorney in Chester County, improperly influenced the resolution of the two cases. Petition ¶¶ 43-44. Petitioner asserts that the panel that issued the October 31, 2024 decision knowingly filed the decision when Petitioner was on vacation to put him “at a disadvantage” when filing an application for reconsideration. *Id.* ¶ 45. He also argues that the Superior Court decisions were issued in contravention of Children’s best interests and contrary to the evidence. *Id.* ¶¶ 46-47. In addition to the causes of action asserted against all Respondents, Petitioner brings claims against the Superior Court of “parental alienation, an abuse of discretion and power, and child endangerment/neglect.” *Id.* ¶ 48 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

C. Averments in Petition Relating to Common Pleas

The Petition alleges that Common Pleas: (1) intentionally listed Petitioner’s property for a tax sale with the intention of removing him from his home; (2) refused to remove the Honorable Allison Boyer from four matters despite potential conflicts of interest; (3) permitted Respondent Williams’s counsel to draft orders and opinions; (4) set Petitioner’s support obligation at an amount that made Petitioner unable to make mortgage payments by falsely inflating Petitioner’s income and

including private school tuition and “extravagant [C]hildren’s activities” in the support calculation; (5) refused to increase Petitioner’s custody of Children to maintain his inflated support obligation; (6) permitted Respondent Williams’s counsel to abuse the no-fault divorce process; (7) did not provide Petitioner with the equitable distribution share to which he was entitled; (8) awarded Respondent Williams primary physical custody of Children notwithstanding evidence that Petitioner was available for school pickup, Petitioner had purchased a new home, and Respondent Williams called Petitioner, who is Black, a racial slur; (9) discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of religion and race; (10) refused to hold Respondent Williams in contempt of the custody order based on her failure to permit visitation; (11) permitted the couple’s eldest child to make his own decision whether to attend custody visits; (12) delayed a school choice hearing until after the start of the 2025-2026 school year under false pretenses; (13) disregarded Respondent Williams’s death threats towards Petitioner; (14) attempted to force Petitioner “to provide insight regarding [the instant] lawsuit” during an unrelated pre-trial conference; (15) denied multiple petitions to proceed *in forma pauperis* in order to force Petitioner out of his home; (16) permitted Respondent Williams to use a false address when requesting support; and (17) improperly included proceeds of the sale of Petitioner’s Maryland property, which was part of the equitable distribution process, as income when calculating his support obligation. *Id.* ¶¶ 49-58, 60-71, 73-78. In addition to the causes of action asserted against all Respondents, Petitioner brings claims against Common Pleas of “PA Code of Judicial Conduct[,] parental alienation, . . . racial discrimination, . . . racial oppression, . . . and [Petitioner’s] 13th Amendment rights.” *Id.* ¶¶ 59, 72, 79 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

II. APPLICATIONS FOR RELIEF

Petitioner filed two applications for relief that remain pending before this Court. On July 23, 2025, Petitioner filed a “Motion to Amend,” in which he effectively seeks mandamus relief. Petitioner asserts that CYF issued notices of determination that four child abuse reports concerning Petitioner were unfounded and that PSP also determined that the reports were unfounded on approximately the same dates. July 23, 2025 Application at 1 (unnecessary emphasis and capitalization omitted). Petitioner requests that this Court enter an order directing CYF and PSP to amend their determinations “from unfounded to false.” *Id.*, Proposed Order (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

On July 28, 2025, Petitioner filed a “Motion for Writ of Mandamus” relating to the same alleged unfounded determinations issued by CYF and PSP. July 28, 2025 Application at 1 (unnecessary emphasis and capitalization omitted). Petitioner indicates that the purpose of the application “is to have law enforcement identify the reasons for the excessive unfounded rulings and to investigate the alleged violations of [the Domestic Relations Code], as it relates to false child abuse allegations and coercion of a child to make such allegations.” *Id.* (unnecessary emphasis and capitalization omitted). Petitioner requests this Court enter an order directing all “appropriate agencies” to investigate the unfounded determinations and “[if] deemed necessary,” correct the “unfounded results . . . to false.” *Id.*, Proposed Order (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

Also relevant to our disposition of this matter, on December 31, 2025, Petitioner filed an application for leave to file a supplemental petition for review to address custody proceedings that occurred after the filing of the Petition. In his proposed supplemental petition attached to the application, Petitioner requested that

this Court declare that Respondents’ actions violated his due process and equal protection rights; enjoin Common Pleas from further reliance on the unfounded reports; order Common Pleas to rule on Petitioner’s pending requests related to Children’s educational and health needs; and grant other prospective relief to protect Petitioner’s rights. Dec. 31, 2025 Application, Exhibit A, at 3-4 (unnumbered). This Court denied this application by an order entered on March 5, 2026.

III. PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS

While Objecting Respondents filed numerous preliminary objections, we need only address one: PSP’s challenge to the subject matter jurisdiction of this Court.⁸ PSP asserts that the Petition may not be brought as an original jurisdiction matter because it falls within the exception of Section 761(a)(1)(v) of the Judicial Code to this Court’s exercise of original jurisdiction actions against the Commonwealth government. This statute provides:

(a) General rule.--The Commonwealth Court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions or proceedings:

(1) Against the Commonwealth government, including any officer thereof, acting in his official capacity, except:

. . .

(v) actions or proceedings in the nature of trespass as to which the Commonwealth government formerly enjoyed sovereign or other immunity and actions or proceedings in the nature of assumpsit relating to such actions or proceedings in the nature of trespass.

42 Pa. C.S. § 761(a)(1)(v). PSP asserts that Petitioner’s federal constitutional claims, which are “clearly” brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and state-law tort

⁸ When a preliminary objection raises a question of subject matter jurisdiction, our function is to determine whether the law will bar recovery due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. *Best v. United Steel Paper & Forestry Rubber Mfg. Energy Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int’l Union*, 299 A.3d 1043, 1048 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023) (*en banc*), *appeal denied*, 312 A.3d 908 (Pa. 2024).

claims fall within the Section 761(a)(1)(v) exception for actions in the nature of trespass and are thus excluded from this Court's original jurisdiction. PSP Brief at 10-11. Although Superior Court and Common Pleas did not raise preliminary objections to this Court's exercise of original jurisdiction, questions of subject matter jurisdiction are non-waivable and may be raised by the court on its own motion. *Domus, Inc. v. Signature Bldg. Sys. of PA, LLC*, 252 A.3d 628, 636 (Pa. 2021). Therefore, we address the question of this Court's subject matter jurisdiction over this matter as it pertains to all Commonwealth Respondents.

This Court has described the Section 761(a)(1)(v) exception as follows:

In *Balshy v. Rank*, 490 A.2d 415 (Pa. 1985), which concerned federal civil rights claims arising from an allegedly wrongful arrest and prosecution, the plaintiff sought money damages under Sections 1983 and 1985 of Title 42 of the United States Code. *Id.* at 416 (analyzing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 & 1985). Our Supreme Court characterized the plaintiff's claims as entailing "a species of tort liability" and concluded that such claims "are outside the original jurisdiction of Commonwealth Court and are properly commenced in the Courts of Common Pleas." *Id.* at 420-21. Similarly, in *Miles v. Beard*, 847 A.2d 161 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004), [*appeal denied*, 870 A.2d 325 (Pa. 2005)], an inmate sought money damages for Section 1983 violations relating to kosher meals, which he had received at prior correctional facilities. *Id.* at 163. This Court concluded that the inmate's allegations belonged at a trial-level court because "this Court lacks original jurisdiction over tort actions for money damages that are premised on either common law trespass or a civil action for deprivation of civil rights." *Id.* at 164.

Money damages claims for violations of other statutory arrangements must also be brought in our trial-level courts. In *Hill v. Department of Environmental Protection*, 679 A.2d 773 (Pa. 1996), the plaintiff asserted employment discrimination under two federal laws, the Pennsylvania Constitution, and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA)[, Act of October 27, 1955, P.L. 744, *as amended*, 43 P.S. §§ 951-963]. Our Supreme Court explained:

These statutory provisions permit Hill to seek monetary damages for unlawful injuries done in the employment context. As such, these claims are in the nature of an action in tort. *See Balshy*,

supra. Therefore, original jurisdiction over Hill's complaint rests with the Lycoming County Court of Common Pleas.

Id. at 774. In fact, the PHRA expressly states that once certain procedural prerequisites are met, a plaintiff "shall be able to bring an action in the courts of common pleas of the Commonwealth based on the right to freedom from discrimination granted by this act." 43 P.S. § 962(c)(1).

Since *Balshy* and *Hill*, our courts have also concluded that employment-oriented money damages claims not sounding in either federal civil rights or statutory arrangements like the PHRA, but based on traditional common law torts, are also properly brought within our trial-level courts. In *Stackhouse v. Commonwealth*, 832 A.2d 1004 (Pa. 2003), the plaintiff claimed that the PSP, her employer, harmed her privacy and reputational interests in the course of an internal investigation in association with her application for a promotion. *Id.* at 1006. Our Supreme Court concluded that this Court lacked jurisdiction and returned the case to the trial-level court because the "core" of the plaintiff's complaint sounded in traditional tort liability for an unlawful injury and for which the Commonwealth formerly enjoyed immunity. *Id.* at 1007-09 (citing *Balshy*); see also *Lynn v. Smith*, 566 A.2d 360, 362 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1989) (declining jurisdiction where plaintiff claimed wrongful discharge and intentional infliction of emotional distress against state agency in connection with employment termination).

. . . As our Supreme Court explained in *Balshy*, after the abrogation of common law sovereign immunity in 1978, which "pav[ed] the way for actions for tort liability against the Commonwealth to be brought in Commonwealth Court," the General Assembly "immediately took action to remove from Commonwealth Court the responsibility for any resulting routine tort litigation":

[E]ach time it became apparent to the General Assembly that actions for tort liability could be maintained against the Commonwealth or its officers in Commonwealth Court the General Assembly amended § 761 to provide that those actions be brought in Common Pleas Court and not in Commonwealth Court. This leads us inescapably to the conclusion that there exists a legislative intent that all actions against the Commonwealth or its officers acting in their official capacity, asserting tort liability, are outside the original jurisdiction of Commonwealth Court.

490 A.2d at 419-20.

Accordingly, the legislature has made clear that **causes of action for money damages against the Commonwealth or its entities that are in “the nature of trespass,” meaning that the core of the action sounds in common law torts or can be reasonably analogized to tort liability, must be brought in our trial-level courts.** *See Stackhouse*, 832 A.2d at 1007 (stating that the plaintiff’s assertions of invasion of privacy, defamation, and infliction of emotional distress “are tort claims in the nature of trespass within the meaning of Section 761(a)(1)(v)”); *Hill*, 679 A.2d at 774 (concluding that the plaintiff’s claims under the PHRA and other theories “are in the nature of an action in tort”); *Balshy*, 490 A.2d at 420 (describing plaintiff’s federal civil rights claims as “a species of tort liability”).

Spallone v. Pa. State Police (Pa. Cmwlth., Nos. 1275-1276 C.D. 2024, filed May 28, 2026), ___ A.3d ___, 2026 WL 1487449, slip op. at 5-7 (emphasis added), *petition for allowance of appeal filed*, (Pa., Nos. 161-162 WAL 2026, filed June 25, 2026).

Here, the “core of the action” brought by Petitioner against the Commonwealth Respondents constitutes a claim for money damages based on common law torts or civil rights actions that “can be reasonably analogized to tort liability.” *Id.*, slip op. at 7. The only relief requested in the Petition is money damages, as Petitioner seeks \$250,000 from each of the Commonwealth Respondents in compensatory and punitive damages. Petition ¶¶ 23, 48, 59, 72, 79. Petitioner’s only cognizable⁹ state-law claims are defamation and discrimination

⁹ Petitioner raises numerous other claims as to which there is no recognized civil cause of action. Obstruction of justice and child endangerment are criminal offenses as to which no private remedy attaches. 18 Pa. C.S. §§ 4304(a), 5101; *see Pelagatti v. Cohen*, 536 A.2d 1337, 1342 (Pa. Super. 1987) (stating that there is no civil cause of action for obstruction of justice); *Doe 203 v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia*, 31 Pa. D. & C. 5th 83 (Phila. Com. Pl. 2013) (holding endangering the welfare of children criminal statute does not imply a private remedy for damages). Furthermore, there is no private cause of action to enforce the Pennsylvania Code of Judicial Conduct. *See Goodheart v. Casey*, 565 A.2d 757, 762 (Pa. 1989) (stating that Code of Judicial Conduct “does not confer substantive rights upon” civil litigants and instead enforcement of the Code is entirely within the Supreme Court’s constitutional supervisory authority over the judiciary). Petitioner asserts several other putative claims—including violation of an unspecified provision of the Domestic Relations Code, parental alienation, “abuse of discretion and power,”

under the PHRA,¹⁰ which our Supreme Court has held fall within the Section 761(a)(1)(v) exception to our original jurisdiction. *See Hill*, 679 A.2d at 774 (stating that an employment discrimination claim under PHRA is “in the nature of an action in tort”); *Balshy*, 490 A.2d at 420 (concluding that defamation falls under Section 761(a)(1)(v)). Furthermore, although Petitioner did not bring his federal claims under Sections 1983 or 1985 of Title 42 of the United States Code, as in *Balshy*, his causes of action asserting violation of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, violation of the Thirteenth Amendment ban on involuntary servitude, and discrimination under the Fair Housing Act,¹¹ are analogous to tort actions.

As discussed above, Petitioner filed applications for relief in this Court seeking mandamus relief and an application for leave to file a supplemental petition requesting declaratory, injunctive, and other equitable relief. Petitioner additionally “requests that this . . . Court issue declaratory and injunctive relief” in his omnibus brief in response to the preliminary objections.¹² Petitioner’s Nov. 2, 2025 Brief at

“assisting with the evasion of Trooper Sperazza,” and “not recording child[] interviews”—which also do not appear to be recognized causes of action. Petition ¶¶ 23, 48, 59, 72, 79 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). Even if these claims were cognizable, it appears that they would be “in the nature of an action in tort” and therefore fall outside our original jurisdiction. *Hill*, 679 A.2d at 774.

¹⁰ Petitioner states in his omnibus brief in opposition to the preliminary objections that his claims of “discrimination,” “racial discrimination,” and “racial oppression” are premised on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Section 5(a) of the PHRA, 43 P.S. § 955(a). Petition ¶¶ 23, 48, 59, 72, 79 (unnecessary capitalization omitted); Petitioner’s Nov. 2, 2025 Brief at 1, 4 (unnumbered).

¹¹ Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, commonly known as the Fair Housing Act, “broadly prohibits discrimination in housing throughout the Nation,” based on an individual’s race, color, religion, sex, familial status, national origin, or disability. *Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood*, 441 U.S. 91, 93 (1979); 42 U.S.C. § 3604.

¹² To the extent relevant to the Commonwealth Respondents, Petitioner requests in his brief that this Court declare that Respondents violated his statutory and constitutional rights, compel an

5-6 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). In *Stackhouse*, our Supreme Court addressed the question of whether the inclusion of injunctive and declaratory relief claims in an action primarily seeking money damages against the Commonwealth government defeated application of the Section 761(a)(1)(v) exception to our original jurisdiction. In that case, the petitioner claimed that her employer, PSP, violated her constitutional rights by investigating her personal affairs in connection with her application for a promotion. *Stackhouse*, 832 A.2d at 1006. In addition to money damage claims premised on civil rights violations, the petitioner further sought a declaration that her privacy and reputational interests were harmed and an injunction restraining the use of any information obtained regarding her private life. *Id.* The Court distinguished its prior decision in *Fawber v. Cohen*, 532 A.2d 429 (Pa. 1987), which found that a class-action seeking a declaration that certain administrative regulations were unconstitutional and an injunction precluding the enforcement of the regulations did not fall within the Section 761(a)(1)(v) exception and therefore original jurisdiction was proper in this Court. *Stackhouse*, 832 A.2d at 1008; *Fawber*, 532 A.2d at 431-34. The Court in *Stackhouse* concluded:

The sum and substance of [the petitioner's] complaint, then, is that her privacy and reputational interests were invaded when state police officials unlawfully delved into her intimate inter-personal relationships during an internal affairs investigation, and that she is entitled to compensation accordingly. In these circumstances, we do not believe the inclusion of a count for declaratory or injunctive relief premised upon the same events can properly be understood to transform the complaint from one sounding in trespass into the type of matter contemplated by *Fawber*, or by the Legislature, as belonging within the Commonwealth Court's original jurisdiction.

investigation into alleged coercion of a child to report child abuse, direct Common Pleas to “cease discriminatory judicial assignments and ensure equal application of custody and support standards,” and enjoin enforcement of support and custody orders. Petitioner’s Nov. 2, 2025 Brief at 5-6.

Stackhouse, 832 A.2d at 1008. The *Stackhouse* Court further reasoned that “permitting jurisdictional questions to turn solely upon the styling of claims within a complaint would arguably permit forum shopping through pleading.” *Id.*

In *Miles*, the plaintiff, a prisoner, filed a complaint in the court of common pleas under Section 1983 requesting compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive and declaratory relief related to allegations that prison officials failed to serve him kosher meals. *Miles*, 847 A.2d at 163. The court of common pleas dismissed the complaint, in part on grounds that it lacked original jurisdiction, and the plaintiff appealed. *Id.* at 163-64. This Court reversed the jurisdictional ruling of the court of common pleas, holding that, “as in *Stackhouse*, the allegation upon which the equity and [Section] 1983 actions rest are clearly the same.” *Id.* at 165. We noted that the plaintiff included all of his requests for relief under a single count, and although it appeared that what he “really want[ed] was] a mandatory injunction rather than money damages, [the plaintiff was] the one who included a request for money damages in his complaint.” *Id.* We further observed the policy rationale underlying a strict application of Section 761(a)(1)(v), namely that “cases within our original jurisdiction are appealable **as of right** to the Supreme Court,” and a broad interpretation of our original jurisdiction ““would crowd cases involving important and unique issues from [the Supreme Court’s] allocatur docket.”” *Id.* (quoting *Gossman v. Lower Chanceford Twp. Bd. of Sup’rs*, 469 A.2d 996, 998 (Pa. 1983)) (emphasis in original).

In the present matter, we conclude that the “sum and substance” of the Petition is an action for money damages based on a traditional tort liability theory and Petitioner’s requests for mandamus, declaratory, and injunctive relief do not vest original jurisdiction in this Court. *Stackhouse*, 832 A.2d at 1008. Initially, we note

that Petitioner only included claims for money damages in the Petition. *See Miles*, 847 A.2d at 165 (“It is not our function to ignore a [petitioner’s] request for relief so that original jurisdiction can be vested in this Court, a court of limited original jurisdiction, rather than in the common pleas court, a court of broad original jurisdiction.”). Moreover, even considering the equitable relief sought in Petitioner’s applications and brief, this case is more like *Stackhouse* and *Miles* than *Fawber*, as Petitioner’s requests for mandamus, declaratory, and injunctive relief “rest[] upon the same allegations” that form the basis of his money damages claims. *Stackhouse*, 832 A.2d at 1008. Specifically, Petitioner seeks a declaration that Respondents committed acts that violated his rights under the statutory and constitutional provisions that formed the basis of his causes of action. Furthermore, to the extent they relate to Commonwealth Respondents, Petitioner’s requests for mandamus and injunctive relief are based on the suspected child abuse reports and custody and support proceedings that underlie his money damages claims.¹³

Accordingly, we hold that, pursuant to Section 761(a)(1)(v) of the Judicial Code, original jurisdiction of the Petition lies with Common Pleas, not this Court. Therefore, we do not address Objecting Respondents’ remaining preliminary objections and Petitioner’s pending applications for relief and instead transfer this matter to Common Pleas. *See* 42 Pa. C.S. § 5103(a) (“If [a] matter is . . . brought in a court . . . of this Commonwealth which does not have jurisdiction of the . . . matter, the court . . . shall not . . . dismiss the matter, but shall transfer the record thereof to

¹³ We note that this Court may only exercise “original jurisdiction in cases of mandamus and prohibition to courts of inferior jurisdiction and other government units where such relief is ancillary to matters within its appellate jurisdiction.” 42 Pa. C.S. § 761(c); *Commonwealth Ex Rel. Stedman v. Duncan*, 147 A.3d 57, 62 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (*en banc*). Exclusive jurisdiction over non-ancillary mandamus or prohibition actions against courts of inferior jurisdiction lies in our Supreme Court. *Stedman*, 147 A.3d at 62.

the proper tribunal of this Commonwealth, where the . . . matter shall be treated as if originally filed[.]”); *Smith v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole*, 349 A.3d 477, 481 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2025) (“If a matter is filed in a court lacking proper jurisdiction, the case should be transferred to the proper tribunal, not dismissed.”).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we sustain PSP’s preliminary objection challenging this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. We transfer this matter to Common Pleas to resolve the remaining preliminary objections filed by Objecting Respondents and Petitioner’s July 23, 2025 and July 28, 2025 applications for relief.

STELLA M. TSAI, Judge

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Sajarvin Williams,	:	SEALED CASE
Petitioner	:	
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v.	:	
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Pennsylvania Superior Court,	:	
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Nefertiti Jordan, Esquire, Ashley	:	
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Williams,	:	
Respondents	:	No. 250 M.D. 2025

ORDER

AND NOW, this 29th day of September, 2026, Respondent Pennsylvania State Police's first preliminary objection, challenging this Court's subject matter jurisdiction, is SUSTAINED. This matter is TRANSFERRED to the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County in accordance with Section 5103(a) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. § 5103(a).

STELLA M. TSAI, Judge