

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Charles J. Walsh, III, Laura Blau, and	:	
Philadelphia Community Development	:	
Coalition, Inc.	:	
	:	No. 1352 C.D. 2024
v.	:	
	:	Submitted: May 12, 2026
Teresa Isabella and 325 S. 18th Street,	:	
LLC	:	
	:	
Appeal of: 325 S. 18th Street, LLC	:	

BEFORE: HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge
HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

**MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
JUDGE DUMAS**

FILED: September 15, 2026

325 S. 18th Street, LLC (Appellant) appeals from the order entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (Common Pleas) on October 2, 2024, through which Common Pleas dismissed as moot Appellant’s “11th Motion to Terminate Philadelphia Community Development Coalition, Inc.’s [(PCDC)] Conservatorship” (11th Motion to Terminate). We affirm on alternate grounds and, in addition, deny Appellant’s “Emergency Application for a Stay and Supersedeas of Common Pleas’ July 16, 2026 Order Pending Appeal Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1732(b) & 1733(b); and Pending Appellant’s July 17, 2026 Application for Relief to This Court” (Emergency Application).

I. BACKGROUND

This appeal marks the latest development in the decade-long dispute over a property located at 325 South 18th Street in Philadelphia (Property). As we previously recounted in another opinion addressing this situation:

On June 3, 2016, Charles J. Walsh, III, Laura Blau, and PCDC filed in Common Pleas a Petition for Appointment of a Conservator (Petition) under the Abandoned and Blighted Property Conservatorship Act, Act of November 26, 2008, P.L. 1672, No. 135, *as amended*, 68 P.S. §§ 1101-1120, commonly known as Act 135.¹ The subject of the Petition was a blighted building located [on the] Property. [Teresa] Isabella was the owner of the Property at the time the Petition was filed. On April 28, 2017, 325 S. 18th Street LLC purchased the Property from Isabella for \$1,000,000 and was granted intervenor status in the Act 135 proceedings.

¹ Walsh and Blau have not participated in the underlying Act 135 litigation or any related appeals since May 2017.

On May 17, 2017, Common Pleas granted the Petition and appointed PCDC as conservator of the Property. In September 2018, Common Pleas held a hearing on PCDC's Final Plan for Blight Remediation (Final Plan), which detailed how PCDC would restore the Property to comply with applicable municipal code requirements. On September 24, 2018, Common Pleas approved the Final Plan.

In the ensuing years, [Isabella and 325 S. 18th Street LLC (the appellants)] filed a plethora of motions in Common Pleas in which they sought to, *inter alia*, terminate the Act 135 conservatorship, remove PCDC as conservator, and disqualify multiple trial judges involved in the case, which were denied. [The a]ppellants have filed [more than 20] appeals from those adverse rulings in both this Court and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which were unsuccessful. In 2021, [the a]ppellants also filed two actions against PCDC and various individuals in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania asserting claims of conspiracy, which were

dismissed. One of those actions proceeded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which affirmed the dismissal of the matter. PCDC has since worked to remediate the property in accordance with the Final Plan.

Walsh v. Isabella (Pa. Cmwlth., Nos. 577 C.D. 2022, 624 C.D. 2022, 1166 C.D. 2022, 1235 C.D. 2022, 76 C.D. 2023, filed Dec. 23, 2024) (*Walsh I*), slip op. at 1-2, 2024 WL 5196043, at *1 (cleaned up). Common Pleas subsequently took additional actions to bring this matter to a close, including *inter alia* granting PCDC’s “Motion to Approve the Sale of the Property 325 S 18th Street, Philadelphia, PA, 19103” (Sale Motion) on January 6, 2022, which authorized PCDC to sell the Property to OCF Holdings LLC or an affiliate thereof, and issuing a “Final Order” on October 7, 2022, which awarded costs and fees to PCDC and dictated the handling of the sale’s proceeds. *Id.*, slip op. at 2-5, 2024 WL 5196043, at *1-*3.

Appellant nevertheless continued to challenge PCDC’s conservatorship over the Property by repeatedly filing new, albeit substantially similar termination motions in Common Pleas. Eventually, Appellant filed its 11th Motion to Terminate on August 16, 2024, which Common Pleas dismissed as moot via its October 2, 2024 order. This appeal to our Court followed shortly thereafter.¹

¹ On January 29, 2026, we issued an order precluding Blau, Isabella, PCDC, and Walsh from filing briefs or otherwise participating in this appeal, due to their failure to file briefs in accordance with this matter’s scheduling order. Cmwlth. Ct. Ord., 1/29/26, at 1.

On June 16, 2026, we issued an opinion and order in this matter, through which we affirmed Common Pleas’ dismissal based upon our conclusion that Common Pleas had lacked jurisdiction to rule upon the 11th Motion’s merits, due to what we concluded was Common Pleas’ issuance of a final order on October 7, 2022. *See Walsh v. Isabella* (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1352 C.D. 2024, filed June 16, 2026). Appellant subsequently filed an application for reargument; an application for relief, through which it sought enforcement of our June 16, 2026 order; and the aforementioned Emergency Application. On July 28, 2026, we issued an order, through which we granted the application for reargument in part, thereby vacating our June 16, 2026 opinion and order; dismissed as moot the application for relief; and indicated that the Emergency Application would be considered in tandem with this appeal. *See* Cmwlth. Ct. Ord., 7/28/26, at 1.

II. DISCUSSION²

A. Appeal

We summarize and reorder Appellant's arguments as follows. First, Appellant asserts that Common Pleas erred by dismissing the 11th Motion to Terminate, because Common Pleas had not issued a final order in this matter at that point and thus retained jurisdiction to address the merits of the 11th Motion to Terminate, despite the appeals that were then pending before our Court. Second, Appellant relatedly maintains that Common Pleas' October 2, 2024 order, through which the 11th Motion to Terminate was dismissed as moot, was an interlocutory order that was appealable as of right. Finally, Appellant contends that Common Pleas was required to terminate PCDC's conservatorship pursuant to Act 135, due to PCDC's purported continued failure to maintain the Property and consequent violation of the Philadelphia Property Maintenance Code, as well as fraud allegedly committed by PCDC and Gardner Fox, a private construction firm engaged by PCDC to do work on the Property. Appellant's Br. at 24-41.

We agree with Appellant that Common Pleas erred by dismissing the 11th Motion to Terminate on the basis of mootness. Common Pleas justified this dismissal by explaining that its October 7, 2022 order was final in nature and that, per Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1701, Appellant's request for relief via the 11th Motion to Terminate was moot because Appellant had already appealed that final order. Common Pleas Op., 10/25/24, at 2. This reasoning is inaccurate for several reasons. First, and contrary to Common Pleas' assertion of finality, its October 7, 2022 order was not final in nature, because that finality was contingent

² Our review in this matter is limited to determining whether Common Pleas abused its discretion or committed an error of law. *Phila. Cmty. Dev. Coal., Inc. v. Fassett trustee for Fassett*, 312 A.3d 377, 385 n.11 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024).

upon the consummation of an agreement of sale that had already expired, as well as the heretofore uncompleted settlement on the Property and distribution of the sale's proceeds. *See* Common Pleas Ord., 10/7/22, at 1-6; *see generally* Appellant's Appl. for Reargument. Second, the mere fact that Appellant's appeal of the October 7, 2022 order was pending at the time it filed its 11th Motion did not consequently render that motion moot. Rule 1701(a) states that, generally speaking, "after an appeal is taken . . . , the trial court . . . may no longer proceed further in the matter." Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a). Thus, the default rule is that a trial court loses *jurisdiction* to make rulings once an appeal has been filed in the underlying matter. *Id.* This loss of jurisdiction does not necessarily render a matter *moot*, however, as an active case or controversy usually still exists during the pendency of an appeal.³ Third, Common Pleas retained jurisdiction to rule upon the 11th Motion. As articulated in Rule 311(a)(2), an interlocutory order that denies a request to terminate a property

³ As we have previously explained:

Generally, a case will be dismissed as moot if there exists no actual case or controversy. *Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Phila.*, 789 A.2d 858 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). The existence of a case or controversy requires

(1) a legal controversy that is real and not hypothetical, (2) a legal controversy that affects an individual in a concrete manner so as to provide the factual predicate for a reasoned adjudication, and (3) a legal controversy with sufficiently adverse parties so as to sharpen the issues for judicial resolution.

Dow Chemical Co. v. U.S. Env't. Prot. Agency, 605 F.2d 673, 678 (3rd Cir.1979). A controversy must continue through all stages of judicial proceedings, trial and appellate, and the parties must continue to have a "personal stake in the outcome" of the lawsuit. *Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp.*, 494 U.S. 472, 477-478 (1990) (quotation omitted).

Mistich v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 863 A.2d 116, 119 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) (cleaned up).

conservatorship is immediately appealable as of right. Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(2).⁴ Furthermore, per Rule 311(h), the jurisdictional constraints imposed upon a trial court via Section 1701(a) are inapplicable in the event an appeal has been taken pursuant to Rule 311(a)(2). Pa.R.A.P. 311(h).

In this instance, Common Pleas concluded that it lacked authority to rule upon the 11th Motion to Terminate, because Appellant had a then-pending appeal before this Court regarding Common Pleas' denial of Appellant's 7th Motion to Terminate PCDC's Conservatorship (7th Motion). *See* Common Pleas Op., 10/25/24, at 2 (referencing *Walsh v. Isabella* (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1166 C.D. 2022)); *Walsh v. Isabella* (Pa. Cmwlth., Nos. 577 C.D. 2022, 624 C.D. 2022, 1166 C.D. 2022, 1235 C.D. 2022, and 76 C.D. 2023, filed Dec. 23, 2024), slip op. at 5, 2024 WL 5196043, at *3 (noting that the appeal filed at 1166 C.D. 2022 pertained to the 7th Motion).⁵ That denial falls squarely within the carve-out created by Rule

⁴ General Rule. An appeal may be taken as of right and without reference to Pa.R.A.P. 341(c) from the following types of orders:

....

(2) Attachments, etc. An order confirming, modifying, dissolving, or refusing to confirm, modify or dissolve an attachment, custodianship, receivership, or similar matter affecting the possession or control of property, except for orders pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 3323(f), 3505(a).

Pa.R.A.P. 311(a).

⁵ The appeal filed at 1166 C.D. 2022 also related to an order issued by Common Pleas that denied Appellant's Motion to Strike Trial Exhibits. *See Walsh v. Isabella* (Pa. Cmwlth., Nos. 577 C.D. 2022, 624 C.D. 2022, 1166 C.D. 2022, 1235 C.D. 2022, and 76 C.D. 2023, filed Dec. 23, 2024), slip op. at 5, 2024 WL 5196043, at *3. That type of order, which constitutes a ruling on evidence admissibility in a civil matter, does not come within any of the exceptions to the general rule that bars interlocutory orders and fails to satisfy the collateral order test. *See* Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)-(f), 313. Furthermore, Appellant did not request and obtain Common Pleas' assent to appeal that order on an interlocutory basis. *See* Pa.R.A.P. 312. Therefore, the appeal of this motion was improper and did not deprive Common Pleas of jurisdiction to rule upon the 11th Motion to Terminate. *See* Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b) ("After an appeal is taken or review of a quasijudicial order is (Footnote continued on next page...)

311(a)(2) and (h), and therefore did not divest Common Pleas of the ability to rule upon the 11th Motion's merits.⁶

This does not mean that Common Pleas committed reversible error through its disposition of the 11th Motion to Terminate, however, as the law of the

sought, the trial court or other government unit may: . . . (6) Proceed further in any matter in which a non-appealable interlocutory order has been entered, notwithstanding the filing of a notice of appeal or a petition for review of the order.”).

Furthermore, none of the other appeals that were pending at that time of the 11th Motion to Terminate's filing served to strip Common Pleas of jurisdiction to rule upon the 11th Motion to Terminate's merits. Those appeals pertained to Common Pleas' orders that granted PCDC's Motion for Finality and Increased Bond (Finality Motion), as well as PCDC's Fee and Cost Petition (Fee Petition); denied Appellant's Post-Trial Motion and Motion to Strike Act 135 Petition; and dismissed Appellant's 6th, 8th, and 9th Motions to Terminate, Motion to Strike Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Fourth Motion to Disqualify the Trial Judge. *See Walsh v. Isabella* (Pa. Cmwlth., Nos. 577 C.D. 2022, 624 C.D. 2022, 1166 C.D. 2022, 1235 C.D. 2022, and 76 C.D. 2023, filed Dec. 23, 2024), slip op. at 5, 2024 WL 5196043, at *3. The order that granted the Finality Motion was void *ab initio*. *Id.*, slip op. at 9, 4-5. In addition, the orders that granted the Fee Petition and dismissed the Motion to Strike Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Fourth Motion to Disqualify the Trial Judge, and Post-Trial Motion were all interlocutory orders that were not immediately appealable by right or on a collateral basis, and regarding which Appellant did not seek or obtain permission to appeal. *See Martinez v. Dep't of Hum. Servs.* (Pa. Cmwlth., filed Aug. 6, 2025), slip op. at 5-6, 2025 WL 1720236, at *3 (order denying motion to recuse judge is not immediately appealable on collateral or interlocutory basis); *N. Side LLC v. O'Neill Maint.*, 316 A.3d 1046, 1051 (Pa. Super. 2024) (a post-trial motion is not appropriate or necessary in an Act 135 matter unless it pertains to an order issued after a trial-like proceeding that disposed of all active claims and issues); *Lerch v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev.*, 180 A.3d 545, 550 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (“In general, Superior Court decisions are not binding on this Court, but they offer persuasive precedent where they address analogous issues.”); 210 Pa. Code § 69.414 (unreported Commonwealth Court opinions issued after January 15, 2008, may be cited as persuasive authority). Therefore, Common Pleas retained jurisdiction over this matter, despite those appeals, per Rule 1701(b)(6). Finally, the orders that denied the Motion to Strike Act 135 Petition and dismissed the 6th, 8th, and 9th Motions to Terminate were each appealable by right on an interlocutory basis, per Rule 311(a)(2), and did not create any Rule 1701(a)-based limitations on Common Pleas' jurisdiction in this matter, per Rule 311(h).

⁶ Common Pleas' dismissal of the 11th Motion to Terminate was an interlocutory order that was appealable as of right under Rule 311(a)(2).

case doctrine precludes the relief Appellant sought therein.⁷ “This doctrine refers to a family of rules which embody the concept that a court involved in the later phases of a litigated matter should not reopen questions decided by another judge of that same court or by a higher court in the earlier phases of the matter.” *Commonwealth v. Starr*, 664 A.2d 1326, 1331 (Pa. 1995). “[It] serve[s] not only to promote . . . judicial economy . . . but also . . . (1) to protect the settled expectations of the parties; (2) to insure uniformity of decisions; (3) to maintain consistency during the course of a single case; (4) to effectuate the proper and streamlined administration of justice; and (5) to bring litigation to an end.” *Id.* The law of the case can be discarded “only in exceptional circumstances such as where there has been an intervening change in the controlling law, a substantial change in the facts or evidence giving rise to the dispute in the matter, or where the prior holding was clearly erroneous and would create a manifest injustice if followed.” *Id.* at 1332.⁸

To state the obvious, the 11th Motion to Terminate was preceded by 10 separate motions to terminate. Through those predecessor motions, Appellant

⁷ [T]his Court may affirm an order on appeal if it is “right for any reason.” *In re A.J.R.-H.*, 188 A.3d 1157, 1175-76 (Pa. 2018). Under this “right for any reason” doctrine, a reviewing court has the authority to affirm a lower court’s decision on any basis, so long as it is supported by the record. *Id.* [I]n cases where the facts of record are undisputed, we may apply [this] doctrine. *Bearoff v. Bearoff Bros.*, 327 A.2d 72, 76 (Pa. 1974). Where disputed facts must be resolved, however, our Court does not “assum[e] the role of fact-finder in an attempt to sustain the action of the court below.” *Id.* Rather, we apply the “right for any reason” doctrine in cases where the undisputed facts support a legal conclusion which, while different from the lower court’s legal conclusion, produces the same outcome. *In re A.J.R.-H.*, 188 A.3d at 1175-76.

Appeal of Clarke, 316 A.3d 1095, 1104 n.9 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024) (cleaned up).

⁸ A “clearly erroneous” holding is one that would “face . . . almost certain reversal on appellate review.” *Zane v. Friends Hosp.*, 836 A.2d 25, 29 (Pa. 2003).

consistently challenged the continued existence of PCDC's conservatorship by presenting different argument permutations that centered upon PCDC's allegedly inadequate maintenance of the Property; noncompliance with Act 135; and fraudulent activity. *See, e.g.* Appellant's 9th Mot. to Terminate (asserting that PCDC has been cited multiple times for inadequate maintenance, had failed to bring the Property into compliance with the relevant local ordinances, and had committed insurance fraud); Appellant's 7th Mot. to Terminate (alleging extensive fraudulent activity and manifestly deficient property maintenance); Appellant's 4th Mot. to Terminate (arguing that PCDC was not complying with either Act 135 or the relevant property maintenance codes); *see also Phila. Cmty. Dev. Coal. v. Isabella* (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1129 C.D. 2023, filed Apr. 7, 2026), slip op. at 3-7 (quashing appeal regarding dismissal of 10th Motion to Terminate, on basis that Appellant had failed to comply with Rules of Appellate Procedure, while also stating that Appellant would not have been entitled to relief on merits, because it had only made bald, unsupported allegations of impropriety against Common Pleas and PCDC); *Walsh v. Isabella* (Pa. Cmwlth., Nos. 47 & 48 C.D. 2022, filed June 13, 2025), slip op. at 5-7, 2025 WL 1672335, at *3-*4 (affirming denial of 5th Motion to Terminate and highlighting Common Pleas' observation that Appellant had baldly alleged that PCDC had committed various forms of fraud and illegal activity both within and without the conservatorship); *Walsh v. Isabella* (Pa. Cmwlth., Nos. 577 C.D. 2022, 624 C.D. 2022, 1166 C.D. 2022, 1235 C.D. 2022, and 76 C.D. 2023, filed Dec. 23, 2024), slip op. at 12-17, 2024 WL 5196043, at *6-*9 (quashing appeals regarding denials of 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th Motions to Terminate, due to Appellants' failure to comply with Rules of Appellate Procedure, and noting that "[a]fter 21 state court appeals and 2 federal cases, Appellants continue to assert the same allegations of

bias, conspiracy, and collusion that multiple courts have rejected as baseless”); *Walsh v. Isabella* (Pa. Cmwlth., Nos. 1689 & 1781 C.D. 2019, filed June 23, 2021), slip op. at 8-11, 2021 WL 2580603, at *4-*5 (affirming denials of 3rd and 4th Motions to Terminate and approvingly mentioning Common Pleas’ observation that the 3rd and 4th Motions “were nearly identical to [Appellant’s] prior motions to terminate”); *Phila. Cmty. Dev. Coal. v. Isabella* (Pa. Cmwlth., Nos. 11, 12, & 268 C.D. 2019, filed Aug. 28, 2020), slip op. at 18-22, 2020 WL 5080001, at *6-*8 (affirming denial of 2nd Motion to Terminate, on the basis that PCDC’s conservatorship of the Property complied with Act 135, and noting that Appellant “made many general [irrelevant] allegations of wrongdoing” and had not availed itself of the Act 135 process through which an owner may seek to rehabilitate their property); *Walsh v. Isabella* (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 862 C.D. 2018, filed Apr. 24, 2020), slip op. at 6-11, 2020 WL 1970774, at *3-*4 (affirming denial of 1st Motion to Terminate, because the sole code violation citation incurred by PCDC at that point had been issued prior to court approval of PCDC’s remediation plan, as well as because Appellant had not sought permission to rehabilitate the Property as allowed under Act 135). In each instance where Appellant appealed Common Pleas’ denial or dismissal of a motion to terminate, we either affirmed Common Pleas’ disposition thereof or quashed Appellant’s appeal. *See Isabella, supra*.

As for the 11th Motion to Terminate, Appellant essentially made two assertions therein: first, PCDC has continued to inadequately maintain the Property; and second, PCDC and affiliated entities have committed fraud in connection with PCDC’s operation of the conservatorship. 11th Mot. to Terminate, ¶¶3-32. The former rests upon photographs of the Property that were taken in August 2022 and August 2024, which show foliage overgrowth at various locations and unrepaired

areas along the exterior of the Property's residence, as well as a single citation from July 2024 for litter on the sidewalk abutting the Property. *See id.*, ¶¶2-4. The latter is predicated upon another conservatorship matter involving PCDC and an entirely different, unrelated property; bald allegations that PCDC and its president forged checks and committed loan fraud; and conjecture regarding the broader implications of the May 2020 death of a former Gardner Fox estimator who had been involved with the Property during the course of the conservatorship. *See id.*, ¶¶5-32. Much of this material is duplicative of the arguments and evidence Appellant offered through its previous motions to terminate, and is otherwise overwhelmingly irrelevant or speculative; to the extent it is not, this material merely establishes that PCDC has received a single new, minor maintenance citation, as well as that the Property appeared as of August 2024 to be largely in the same state as it has been throughout and prior to PCDC's conservatorship, albeit with additional overgrowth. *Compare id.*, ¶¶2-4 with, *e.g.*, 9th Mot. to Terminate at 5 and ¶¶61-64; 7th Mot. to Terminate, ¶¶61-64; 4th Mot. to Terminate, ¶175. We therefore hold that this matter's facts and evidence have not substantially changed in the time between our disposition of Appellant's previous appeals and the present. Furthermore, no intervening changes to controlling law have taken place, and we have no reason to believe that our treatment of those previous appeals was clearly erroneous and manifestly unjust. Accordingly, we conclude that the law of the case doctrine applies in this instance and bars Appellant from using the 11th Motion to Terminate to extinguish PCDC's conservatorship of the Property.

B. Emergency Application

Finally, we conclude that Appellant cannot secure the relief it seeks via its Emergency Application. Therein, Appellant requests a stay or *supersedeas* of

Common Pleas’ order, docketed on July 17, 2026, through which Common Pleas granted PCDC’s Second Motion to Approve Sale and thereby authorized PCDC to sell the Property to PS Property Group, LLC. *See* Emergency Appl. at 1-9, Exh. B. Appellant asserts that such relief is necessary because there is a “substantial question” as to whether Common Pleas’ ruling is reconcilable with our June 16, 2026 opinion and order, in which we held that Common Pleas lacked jurisdiction to alter the status quo because it had already issued a final order in this matter on October 7, 2022. *See id.* at 2-6; *see also id.* at 1 (asking this Court “to preserve its own jurisdiction and the integrity of its June 16, 2026 decision before third parties permanently alter property rights[, and to maintain] . . . the status quo . . . long enough for this Court to determine whether Common Pleas possessed authority to [approve the sale] in the first instance”).

Such relief is precluded, however, by our July 28, 2026 order. When an appellate court grants a litigant’s request for reconsideration or reargument, it “effectively vacates [the] prior order” that was the subject of that request. 20A West’s Pa. Prac., Appellate Practice § 2546:3. Where this also causes the court to withdraw a judicial opinion, litigants cannot subsequently use that opinion to support their position in the underlying case, because the withdrawn opinion does not have any legal effect. *See Krysmalski by Krysmalski v. Tarasovich*, 622 A.2d 298, 300 n.1 (Pa. Super. 1993). As mentioned above, our July 28, 2026 order granted Appellant’s application for reargument in part and expressly withdrew our June 16, 2026 opinion and order. *See* Cmwlt. Ct. Ord., 7/28/26, at 1. This grant thus rendered the June 16, 2026 opinion and order as nullities, which therefore vitiates the reasoning upon which Appellant has predicated its Emergency Application.

III. CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing analysis, we affirm Common Pleas' October 2, 2024 order and deny Appellant's Emergency Application.

LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

Charles J. Walsh, III, Laura Blau, and :
Philadelphia Community Development :
Coalition, Inc. :
 : No. 1352 C.D. 2024
v. :
 :
Teresa Isabella and 325 S. 18th Street, :
LLC :
 :
Appeal of: 325 S. 18th Street, LLC :

AND NOW, this 15th day of September, 2026, it is hereby ORDERED:

2. 325 S. 18th Street, LLC’s “Emergency Application for a Stay and Supersedeas of Common Pleas’ July 16, 2026 Order Pending Appeal Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1732(b) & 1733(b); and Pending Appellant’s July 17, 2026 Application for Relief to This Court” is DENIED.

LORI A. DUMAS, Judge